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A Many Layered Wonder: Nonvehicular Air
Pollution Control Law In California
By WILLIAM SIMMONS* and ROBERT H. CUTTING, JR.**
IF a survey were taken to determine which state is best known
for smog, the dubious distinction would likely belong to California.
Yet California has also experienced a high level of development in
both legal and technological strategies for the control of its air pollu-
tion problems. The purpose of ,this article is to explore the existing
legal structure of air pollution regulation in California, and to analyze
certain problems therein.
We propose first to describe the various theoretical approaches
to air pollution control and to contrast them with California's basic
strategy for such regulation. We will then examine the components
of air pollution control in the state through an analysis of the Air Pol-
lution Control Districts (APCDs), -the Air Resources Board (ARB),
and other entities having legal effect on .the process. Next we will
study the functioning of these components through discussion of the
policy making process, some specific programs, and the enforcement
system. Last we will explore some of the problems with, and tensions
in, the existing scheme. Throughout, particularly in the footnotes,
we will point out anomalies in the complex air pollution control laws.
We will not discuss vehicular emissions regulation; this is a subject
worthy of separate examination.
California's Basic Strategy for Air Quality Management
There are a number of theories available on which to ground any
particular program of air pollution control. In this section, we will ex-
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amine the California approach, and then, in order to provide a back-
ground for understanding the particular methods utilized in California,
we will turn to the various alternative strategies.
The Current California Approach
California's basic strategy for air pollution regulation is a program
of direct control over what goes into the air. This is achieved in nu-
merous ways, but the fundamental framework is very simple: state-
wide criteria for the quality of the air are set,' and then either emissions
or performance standards are implemented to reach the targeted lev-
els.
2
The first criterion, which specifies levels of atmospheric concen-
tration for each of several pollutants, is called the "ambient air qual-
ity"3 standard. California has required these measures since 1967, and
the federal government since 1970.
4
Both emissions and performance standards have been imple-
mented to meet these regulations. The former5 specify what quantity
of specific materials may be released into the air, and complicated for-
mulae are sometimes used to impose the limitations on various types
of pollutants.6 The federal government has also promulgated emis-
sions standards for certain sources.
7
Performance standards, on the other hand, specify the type of
air pollution equipent or process thought best able to control emis-
sions, thereby indirectly limiting such emissions themselves.8
1. CAL. HEALTH & S. CODE § 39051(b) (West 1973); CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit.
17, § 70200.
2. See, e.g., CAi. HEALTH & S. CODE §§ 39273-76 (West 1973).
3. "'Ambient air quality standards' means specified concentrations and dura-
tions of pollutants which reflect the relationship between the intensity and composition
of pollution to the undesirable effects." Id. § 39008.5.
4. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970 § 4(a), 42 U.S.C. §§ 1857c-4, 1857c-5
(Supp. 1974); CAL. HEALTH & S. CODE § 39051(b) (West 1973).
5. "'Emissions standards' means specified limitations on the discharge of pollu-
tants into the atmosphere." CAL. HEALTH & S. CODE § 39009 (West 1973).
6. See, e.g., Bay Area Air Pollution Control District (BAAPCD) Regulation 2,
as amended, 1969.
7. 40 C.F.R. pt. 60 (1973).
8. This approach was adopted by the Air Resources Board on August 15, 1974,
with respect to sandblasting operations in California. CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 17, §§
92000-520. A variation of the performance standards concept is sometimes utilized by
the Los Angeles APCD, which may specify certain types of equipment to be used as
a method of enforcing emissions standards through the permit system used in that dis-
trict. See generally Chass & Feldman, Tears for John Doe, 27 S. CAL. L. REV. 349
(1954); Mix, The Misdemeanor Approach to Pollution Control, 10 ARiz. L. REV. 90
(1968); See also Walker, Enforcement of Performance Requirements with Injunctive
THE H-ASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 26
September 19743 CALIFORNIA POLLUTION CONTROL LAW
Alternative Strategies
The regulatory approach characterized by emissions and perform-
ance standards has been the subject of certain criticism.9 Economist
Robert U. Ayres points out, for example, that since industry almost
always cushions its internal economics, its estimates of "feasibility"
tend to result in the promulgation of standards which are less stringent
than existing technology would actually permit.10 Although it may be
argued that such cushioning is taken into account in the development
of standards, it is clear that the opportunity for such industry influence
does exist.
Unequal Standards
J.H. Dales, a Canadian economist, notes that it may be economi-
cally inefficient to have equal standards for all industries emitting the
same pollutant: it may cost one substantially more -to control a partic-
ular pollutant than it would cost another.11 Hence, the industry which
can regulate the greatest amount of such emissions for the least rela-
tive expense should have the most stringent standards for that pollu-
tant, while others whose cost of controlling the same emissions would
be significantly higher should have comparatively lax standards. Thus,
Dales argues, the average would equal the same total emissions at re-
duced overall expense; he concedes, however, that the cost of adminis-
tering source-by-source standards is relatively high. 12
Procedure, 10 Amz. L REV. 81 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Walker]. Walker argues
that a specifications approach impedes creativity in design, to the detriment of air pol-
lution technology.
9. Without embarking on an extended economic analysis, it seems essential to
briefly elucidate a theory which underpins much of the ensuing discussion of alterna-
tives to the regulatory approach to air pollution control.
"Externalities," or more properly "external diseconomies," when taken in the con-
text of pollution can best be illustrated by means of an example. Assume that a fac-
tory is discharging quantities of smoke which drift onto neighboring lands. From the
perspective of economic analysis, when the factory manager decides to emit air con-
taminants, he is probably avoiding the cost of some other method of disposing of the
wastes, or at least escaping the cost of controlling the quantity or quality of the efflu-
ents. Thus, the ultimate expense of production is less than it would be if the factory
were not using the atmosphere as a "free disposal system."
These discharges may well be imposing costs on the recipients of the pollution,
however. This may include (1) actual money damages, (2) damage avoidance costs,
and (3) "general welfare" damages (such as the perhaps unquantifiable injury to vege-
tation caused by certain air pollutants).
10. Ayres, Air Pollution in Cities, 9 NATuRAL RES. 1. 1, 20 (1969) [hereinafter
cited as Ayres].
11. J. DALES, POLLUTION, PROPERTY, AND PRUcas 85 (1968) [hereinafter cited as
DALEs].
12. Id.
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Several problems appear in this sytem. First, it ignores, in con-
templating an "averaging" effect, the possibility (or likelihood) that
the sources of a given pollutant will be located in widely scat-
tered areas without a common impact there or downwind. Further,
it would require not only the fairly complex calculations of emissions
standards, but also the rather elaborate determinations of relative effi-
ciencies of the various industries in meeting the standards. The effect
of possible industry "cushioning" of internal economies must also be
considered; moreover, industry generally objects strenuously to com-
pelled dislosure of production costs and schedules. The potential re-
sult of such an approach is the discovery that industries are suddenly
much less efficient than previously thought. It would seem preferable
to insist upon equality of standards to insure overall air quality control
at the risk of some "inefficiency" than to open the Pandora's box sug-
gested by this theory.,
Various other alternatives to the emissions limits performance
standards method have been suggested. All recognize that air can
no longer be considered the classic "free good," but they approach
the questions of who shall pay for externally imposed costs and how
payment for use of the atmosphere shall be calculated in slightly dif-
ferent manners.
The Outright Subsidy
Under this approach, someone-undoubtedly the government-
would pay a polluter not to pollute. The cost for the amounts of pollu-
tion thus inhibited would therefore be shared by the general pop-
ulation, the theory being that all will benefit from the overall economy
of such waste disposal by industry and from the cleaner environment
obtained thereby.' 3
Criticism of this theory is based on the proposition that each in-
dustry should internalize its own costs, so that only the consumers of
such a pollution source would pay for the emissions control. Cost of
the product would, theoretically, vary according to amount and type
of effluent, and the market would adjust demand in favor of goods
and industries producing less pollutants. Moreover, with a system of
subsidies based solely on a measure of reduced pollution, indus-
tries whose cost of such reduction was small would collect dispropor-
tionately large shares of the funds, and vice-versa for those whose ex-
13. Cf. id. at 81.
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penses were relatively high. Such an approach would also require
huge expenditures by government and high administrative costs.1
4
Tax Incentives
This system includes all manner of tax-reducing devices, from
accelerated depreciation of equipment used in pollution control to out-
right tax credits for money expended in -anti-pollution efforts. 15 The
general theory is similar to that of subsidies: everyone benefits from
environmental improvement, so everyone should pay for it.
However, in addition to certain economic criticisms of this sys-
tem,' 6 it must be noted that tax incentive proposals are often aimed
only at equipment; they generally make no provision for process
changes, which are sometimes the more rational solution. Tax devices
may also tend to encourage development of individual facilities so that
each polluter can maximize his tax savings, whereas cooperative ar-




This theory would impose a tariff on the polluter for every unit
of effluent discharged, presumably scaled by class of pollutant. This
has a certain appeal, as it clearly internalizes control costs; moreover,
the charges would ideally be adjusted to make it economically unwise
for polluters to discharge more effluent than that calculated to achieve
the desired degree of air quality.
14. Id. at 87.
15. See, e.g., Wilson, Tax Assistance and Environmental Pollution, in TAX INSTI-
TUTE OF AMEmCA, TAX INcENIr is (1971). Note some of the bills presented in recent
California legislative sessions: S.B. 394 (1972); S.C.A. 46 (1972); S.C.A. 58 (1972);
S.C.A. 70 (1972); A.C.A. 98 (1973).
16. See generally Wilson, Tax Assistance and Environmental Pollution, in TAX
INsTrruTE OF AmERICA, TAX INCENTIVE 251-52 (1971); Ayres, supra note 10, at 20-
21. These writers point out that most industries with relatively inelastic demand curves
can pass their pollution control costs on to their own consumers, thus internalizing the
external diseconomies directly and efficiently. Moreover, assistance with capital costs
is partly illusory, as only one-third of expenses are generally capital costs; yet total
write-offs would amount to an even greater revenue loss. In addition, some pollution
control measures actually produce profitable by-products, so a tax break becomes a pay-
ment for an already profitable investment.
17. See generally Ayres, supra note 10, at 19; DALES, supra note 11, at 87-88;
Krier, The Pollution Problem and Legal Institutions: A Conceptual Overview, 18
U.C.L.A. L. Rv. 429, 471-72 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Krier]; Wright, Some Aspects
of the Use of Corrective Taxes for Controlling Air Pollution Emissions, 9 NATURAL
RES. 1. 63, 69-70 (1969).
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The advantage of this sytem would seem to be that each source
could calculate the point at which it becomes less expensive to control
than to pollute; thus, the burden of air pollution control would theoret-
ically be shifted to the industries which can do so most efficiently. As
a collateral asset, this approach would obviously produce a potentially
significant revenue increase.
Such a system would, however, require some complex overall cal-
culations and administration, with costs likely to be at least as great
as that of the regulatory approach. Thus, at the present time, the
efficiency of the direct regulatory system appears to outweigh the spec-
ulative economic benefits of the effluent charge program for air pollu-
tion control; a bill which would have implemented the latter type of
plan for sulfur dioxide compounds was defeated by the California leg-
islature in 1972 in part for these practical reasons.' s
The "Pollution Rights" Theory"9
This last approach calls for a determination of the maximum
number of units of any given pollutant permissible in a particular air
basin. That figure would then be translated into "pollution rights,"
each unit of which would entitle the possessor thereof to discharge
a unit of effluent. These "rights" might then be traded on an open
market, and the price allowed to float above a predetermined floor.
20
However, some agency would have to monitor sources to insure
both that only those with rights were discharging and they were only
discharging the amounts of pollutants for which they had rights. More-
over, it would still be necessary to calculate standards and number of
units for each effluent. Thus, it appears that administrative costs
would not be significantly decreased by such a program, if at all, and
again it seems that the speculative economic benefits of the system
do not yet justify a change from the direct, essentially equitable reg-
ulatory approach.
18. S.B. 1472 (1972).
19. See DALES, supra note 11, at 93-97; Krier, supra note 17, at 472-73.
20. The theory holds that the resulting price will reflect the true value of air pol-
lution, and force internalization of costs: an industry must either develop an alterna-
tive to emission or buy the right to pollute. J.H. Dales argues that other actors, such
as environmental groups, might also purchase rights on the market, thereby removing
those units from the hands of industry and discouraging some prospective buyers with
the resulting increase in price. Further, he asserts that a properly functioning market
would require a minimum of regulation, thus decreasing administrative costs (relative
to either regulatory or effluent charge systems). DALES, supra note 11, at 94-95. See
also Krier, supra note 17, at 472-73,
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This is not to say that these theories do not merit consideration
for future utilization; rather, a great deal more study is needed to de-
termine the feasibility of implementing such programs in a manner
which will result both in desirable levels of air quality and in greater
economic efficiency. Insofar as the purported objective of air pollu-
tion control primarily concerns health and welfare, however, it is prob-
able that the direct regulatory approach will be found preferable to
the relatively complex economic parameters proposed as alternatives,
and the interaction with the unpredictable economic markets inherent
therein.
The Components of Air Pollution Control
The County Air Pollution Control District
The county air pollution control district was the first state legisla-
tive system designed exclusively to attack the problem of air pollu-
tion. By 1945 it was apparent that traditional tools, such as the nui-
sance doctrine, were insufficient in themselves to control air contami-
nants, especially in areas where sources were numerous and diverse
in nature.21
Nowhere was this clearer than in the Los Angeles metropolitan
area. In 1945 the city of Los Angeles established a Bureau of Smoke
Control in its Health Department; Los Angeles County created the Of-
fice of Air Pollution Control the following year.22 To achieve enforce-
ment inside cities within the county, the cities were asked to adopt
municipal ordinances similar ,to those of the county. By 1947, how-
ever, only twenty-two of forty-four cities had done so, and it was ap-
parent that administration of existing regulations was not consistently
good throughout the area. In that year the county pushed for and
obtained special legislation empowering a separate agency to control
the growing air pollution problem.23  The policy statement of the new
act reflected the Los Angeles experience: "[ilt is not practical or fea-
21. Limitations inherent in traditional nuisance doctrine include the following:
difficulty in prosecuting multiple sources; difficulty in establishing causal links between
source and injury; conflicts with other laws, such as zoning regulations; and difficulty
in preventing the creation of a nuisance. See Juergensmeyer, Control of Air Pollution
Through the Assertion of Private Rights, 1967 DUKE L.J. 1126; Kennedy, The Legal
Aspects of Air Pollution Control with Particular Reference to the County of Los Ange-
les, 27 S. CAL. L. REV. 373 (1954) [hereinafter cited as Kennedy]; Note, California
Code of Civil Procedure § 731(a): Denial of Private Injunctive Relief from Air Pol-
lution, 22 HASTINGS LJ. 1401 (1971).
22. Chass & Feldman, Tears for John Doe, 27 S. CAL. L. REv. 349, 361 (1954).
23. Cal. Stat. 1947, ch. 632, at 1640.
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sible to prevent or reduce such air contaminants by local county and
city ordinances."24
A special district was created in each county, the boundaries of
which were to be coterminous with those of the county.25 Originally
a district was to become functional in a county only upon a resolution
by its board of supervisors that such a district was actually needed.26
In 1970, however, since only twenty-five counties had so resolved
27
and air pollution continued to increase statewide, the legislature man-
dated activation in the remaining counties.28
"Every air pollution control district is a body corporate and pol-
itic,"' 29 endowed with standard powers, such as perpetual succession,
and the ability to sue and be sued, and to buy, hold, lease and sell
property.3" The jurisdictional authority of a district, and the relation-
ship between that power and the powers of other governmental units
will be more fully explored below.3'
Each district essentially consists of three parts: the legislative
body, called the air pollution control board;12 the executive, entitled
the air pollution control officer;3" and the judiciary, labeled the hear-
ing board.3 4 Nothing in the structure itself is really unique; it merely
reflects the traditional tripartite division of American governmental
entities.
The air pollution control board is composed of the members of
the board of supervisors of the county, who serve ex officio.35 In addition
to the general powers noted previously, the board (1) may make and
enforce orders, rules, and regulations "necessary or proper" to carry
out its responsibilities under the enabling acts; 36 (2) may require that
sources of air pollution obtain a permit from the district before build-
ing or operating; 7 and (3) could require, at least until 1967, the in-
24. CAL. HEALTH & S. CODE § 24199(b) (West 1967).
25. Id. § 24201.
26. Id. §§ 24205-07.
27. Unpublished Table of Air Resources Board [hereinafter cited as Unpublished
Table], showing dates all APCDs were activated. There are 58 counties in California.
28. CAL. HEALTH & S. CODE § 39270 (West 1973).
29. Id. § 24211 (West 1967).
30. Id. § 24212 (West Supp. 1974).
31. See notes 308-25 & accompanying text infra.
32. CAL. HEALTH & S. CODE § 24220 (West 1967).
33. Id. §§ 24222, 24228.
34. Id. § 24225 (West Supp. 1974).
35. ld. § 25220 (West 1967).
36. Id. § 24260.
37. Id. § 24263,
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stallation of air pollution control devices upon motor vehicles.38 More-
over, the board is endowed with a number of powers for enforcement
of emission standards, such as the ability to issue orders for abate-
ment 9 and to recommend prosecution in certain cases.40 Perhaps even
more significantly, this same body, acting as the board of supervisors,
controls the purse strings of the district.41 This can, of course, have
a great impact within the district, since the effectiveness of an air pol-
lution control program can be related to the funding which the district
receives.
42
The air pollution control officer's (APCO) primary duty is to en-
force the standards and prohibitions contained in both state law and
district rules and regulations, and in certain provisions of the Vehicle
Code which relate to air contaminants.43 In order to carry out his
responsibilities the APCO may conduct investigations into the emis-
sion of air pollutants, including searches of buildings. 44  The APCO
is also given peace officer status so that he may make arrests and issue
citations. 45  Further, the APCO is empowered to administer the per-
mit system in those counties which establish such a procedure;48 and,
correlative to that power, he may require a source operator to furnish
him with various data.
47
The hearing board, or variance board as it is sometimes called,
is appointed by the control board. 48  The hearing board was initially
38. Id. § 24263.7. The 1967 Mulford-Carrell Act, Cal. Stat. 1967, ch. 1545, at
3679, gave exclusive authority over vehicular emissions to the State Air Resources
Board. See particularly section 39012 and chapter 4, part I of the act. Section
24263.7 was probably impliedly repealed by the Mulford-Carrell Act.
39. CAL. HEALTH & S. CODE § 24260.5 (West Supp. 1974).
40. Either civil or criminal sanctions may lie; see text accompanying notes 186-
93 infra.
41. CAL. HEA.TH & S. CODE § 24209 (West 1967).
42. Interview with Harmon Wong-Woo, ARB Chief, Division of Implementation
and Enforcement, ARB, in Sacramento, California, May 22, 1974 [hereinafter cited as
Wong-Woo Interview].
43. CAL. HEALTH & S. CODE § 24224 (West Supp. 1974).
44. Id. § 24246 (West 1967). For constitutional questions raised by this section,
see notes 225-32 & accompanying text infra.
45. See CAL. PEN. CODE § 836.5 (West Supp. 1974).
46. CAL. HEALTH & S. CODE § 24263 (West 1967).
47. Id. § 24269. Note that failure to comply with an order to produce such in-
formation is a misdemeanor (id. § 24282) and may result in a suspended permit. Id.
at § 24270. All data obtained by the APCD except trade secrets are public records.
CAL. GOV'T CODE § 6254.7 (West Supp. 1974). See generally id. §§ 6250-60 (relating
to the release of public records).
48. CAL. HEALTH & S. CODE § 24225 (West Supp. 1974).
composed of two lawyers and one engineer, but in 1972 this structure
was altered so that it now consists of five members: one attorney,
one engineer, one doctor, and two lay persons, none of whom is other-
wise employed by the district or the county.49 The rationale for this
change was to obtain a broad nontechnical input into the board's de-
cisionmaking process.
The board has three major functions: to grant variances from
certain state law prohibitions and from district rules and regulations; 50
to review certain actions of the ACPO;51 and, when authorized by the
air pollution control board, to issue orders for abatement.5 2  Of these,
the powers to grant variances and to issue orders of abatement are
probably the most important; hence they are treated separately be-
low.5 3  The review function involves the authority to revoke a permit
or to reinstate permits suspended by the APCO.5 4
The procedure at hearings is much the same as that at any other
administrative hearing. The board may subpoena witnesses and rec-
ords, and judicial review is available from any decision.55  It is in-
teresting to note that few decisions of the hearing board are ap-
pealed. 6
The Unified Air Pollution Control District
Two years after the enactment of the enabling legislation for
county APCDs, the legislature provided a mechanism whereby two or
more continguous counties with functioning air pollution control dis-
tricts could merge their districts into one.57 Santa Cruz and Monterey
Counties so combined in 1968," 8 and Yolo and northeastern Solano
49. Id. § 24225. Specifically, a board must consist of: one member admitted
to practice law in California; one chemical or mechanical engineer; one from the medi-
cal profession with special skills, training, or interest in environmental medicine, com-
munity medicine, or occupational/toxicologic medicine; and two members from the gen-
eral public. If any of the above criteria cannot be met by residents of that county,
the air pollution control board may appoint any person. Id. § 24225(b).
50. Id. § 24291.
51. Id. § 24271, 24275-76 (West 1967 & Supp. 1974).
52. Id. § 24260.5 (West Supp. 1974).
53. See notes 166-76, 198-217 & accompanying text infra.
54. CAL. HEALTH & S. CODE §§ 24274, 24276 (West 1967 & Supp. 1974).
55. Id. §§ 24322-23.
56. Cf. Walker, supra note 8.
57. Cal. Stat. 1949, ch. 1185, at 2104. See generally Brooks, The Metropolis,
Home Rule, and the Special District, 11 HASTINGS L.J. 110, 112 (1959).
58. Unpublished Table, supra note 27.
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Counties"9 unified in 1971.60
Originally each county within a unified district was to be a zone,
and the combined boards of supervisors of each county were to com-
prise the governing board of such districts. 61  However, it became evi-
dent that zones should be based on air pollution control parameters,
and that requiring all five members of each board of supervisors to
attend often distant meetings placed an undue burden on them an4
limited the possibilities that multi-county districts would be formed:
62
a five-county unified district would have had a board composed of
twenty-five persons. In 1972 the legislature amended the enabling
act so that the counties involved could provide by agreement for the
number of supervisors to sit on the unified board, as well as for the
relative weight of each member's vote.63 The new law also provides
that zones, if drawn at all, do not have to be along county lines. 64
Under the new provisions, San Benito County joined the Monterey-
Santa Cruz district on July 1, 1974.65
Each county contributes to the fisc of the unified district in the
proportion that its population bears to that of the unified district at
the date of merger. 66
The Regional Air Pollution Control Districts
Two basic forms of regional district exist: the Bay Area Air Pol-
lution Control District (BAAPCD),11 and -those regional districts pro-
vided for in the Mulford-Carrell Act.68  BAAPCD is not included in
the latter (as it is not within the definition of "regional district")6"
and is operated under an entirely different set of laws. 70
59. The remainder of Solano County is in the Bay Area Air Pollution Control
District.
60. Unpublished Table, supra note 27.
61. Cal. Stat. 1949, ch. 1185, at 2105.
62. Interview with John A. Maga, former ARB Executive Officer, in Sacramento,
California, May 23, 1974 [hereinafter cited as Maga Interview].
63. CAL. HEALTH & S. CODE § 24331 (West Supp. 1974). The utility of
weighted voting is clear in instances when one county has, for example, twice the popu-
lation and three times the air pollution sources of another county with which it seeks
to form a unified district.
64. See id. § 24333.
65. Unpublished Table, supra note 27.
66. CAL. HEALTH & S. CODE § 24337 (West 1967). Why the date of merger
is used is unclear; it would appear better to require revision as population shifts.
67. Id. §§ 24345-74.
68. Id. §§ 39300-570 (West 1973).
69. As that term is defined in the Health and Safety Code section 39005. Id.
§ 39005 (West 1973).
70. Compare id. §§ 24198-341 (West 1967 & Supp. 1974) (county law), with id.
§§ 24345-74 (BAAPCD law).
The Bay Area Air Pollution Control District
In the early 1950's various groups in the San Francisco Bay Area
became concerned with the smog problem in that region.7' At the
same time extensive investigation by an assembly joint subcommittee
indicated that neither the county nor unified enabling acts were suit-
able for application to the Bay Area. There was general consensus
that a regional strategy should be developed because of the peculiar
geography of the area;72 however, if this approach were to be adopted,
the county districts would clearly be inappropriate, while a unified dis-
trict would be cumbersome and impracticable in such a large geographic
area.73 Hence the subcommittee proposed and carried legislation to
create a special air pollution control district within the nine-county Bay
Area."4 It is interesting to note that the subcommittee decided to set
the boundaries at county lines rather than at the 500 foot contour,
which generally marks the air basin.75
Like the county APCD, the BAAPCD has an air pollution con-
trol board, an ACPO, and a hearing board, but there are noticeable
differences from the county model. The air pollution control board
is composed of one member from the board of supervisors of each
county, and one city councilman or mayor from within each county,
nominated by a city selection committee.7 6 (In contrast, a unified dis-
trict board would have consisted of forty-five supervisors.) There is
also an advisory committee within the district to provide additional re-
sources for the governing board.
77
Generally the powers of the BAAPCD are the same as those of
a county APCD.78  At one time it appeared that a substantial differ-
71. See, e.g., BAY AREA Am POLLUTION CONTROL COMMITTEE, SAN FRANCISCO
BAY AREA COUNCIL, A VOLUNTARY PROGRAM FOR AIR POLLUTION CONTROL IN THE SAN
FRANCISCO BAY AREA, INITIAL REPORT (1953).
72. REPORT OF THE JT. SUBCOMM. ON Am POLLUTION OF THE ASSEMBLY IN-
TERIM COMM. ON CONSERVATION, PLANNING AND PUBLIC WORKS, AIR POLLUTION IN
THE SAN FRANCISCO BAY AREA, Assembly Interim Comm. Report vol. XIII, no. 4, at 8
(1955) [hereinafter cited as COMMITTEE REPORT].
73. Id. at 8, 48, 73-77. Specific problems noted by the committee include juris-
diction (between zones); administration, since employees of one zone could function
only within that zone; and apportionment of costs among member counties.
74. Cal. Stat. 1955, ch. 1797, at 3317.
75. COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 72, at 46.
76. CAL. HEALTH & S. CODE § 24352 (West Supp. 1974). See also id. § 24351.
The issue of city representation has long been a volatile one. Note, for example COM-
MIrEE REPORT, supra note 72, at 42-46.
77. CAL. HEALTH & S. CODE §§ 24356-56.5 (West 1967 & Supp. 1974).
78. Compare id. §§ 24260-62 (county law), with id. H9 24362-62.3 (BAAPCD
law).
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ence existed between them in that the BAAPCD did not seem to have
power to establish a permit system similar to that specifically author-
ized in the county law.79  However, the attorney general has recently
opined that such power is implicit in the general authority given the
district to promulgate rules and regulations.8 ° Until quite recently a
second distinction was that the misdemeanor sanctions were not avail-
able to the BAAPCD except for open burning.8'
One other significant feature of the BAAPCD deserves mention:
unlike the county or the unified district, the BAAPCD has the power
to tax, although the district is clearly limited as to the maximum
amount it may so exact, and the formula for apportionment of the re-
sponsibility therefor is also fixed. 2
The nature and function of the APCO in the BAAPCD is essen-
tially the same as that of his counterpart in the county district.8"
The hearing board of the BAAPCD contains the same member-
ship as a county hearing board. 4 It has the same powers as the lat-
ter, 5 but has other responsibilities as well. In an action to recover
a civil penalty for a violation of certain emission standards or rules, 6
the board is given authority to review the merits of the case upon its
own motion, or on motion of the district or -the defendant in such cause.
The hearing board may then either allow the district to proceed with
its action, or it may order that a variance be granted the defendant,
79. See id. § 24263 (West 1967) (expressly authorizes a permit system; no simi-
lar section in the BAAPCD law). Health and Safety Code section 24362.3 prohibits
the BAAPCD from specifying the type of equipment to be used for control of emis-
sions, while the counties are expressly authorized to do so by section 24264. The be-
lief that the BAAPCD did not have permit powers was generally held by both state
and BAAPCD officials. Maga Interview, supra note 62; Telephone Interview with
Matthew S. Walker, former BAAPCD counsel, May 28, 1974 [hereinafter cited as
Walker Interview].
80. Letter from Evelle J. Younger, Attorney General, to John A. Maga, October
6, 1971 (Attorney General No. SO 71/23 I.L.).
81. CAL. HEALTH & S. CODE §§ 24361, 24361.5 (West 1973), which was changed
by giving the Bay Area the same powers as the counties. Cal. Stat. 1974, ch. 455,
§ 1 (July 11, 1974) (adding section 24361.10 to the Health & Safety Code).
82. CAL. HEAI.TH & S. CODE §§ 24370.1-70.6 (West 1967).
83. Compare id. § 24355.2, 24355.4 (West Supp. 1974) (BAAPCD law), with
id. § 24224, 24224.1 (county law). One specific difference is that the APCO in the
Bay Area need not enforce emission-related sections of the Vehicle Code unless the
BAAPCD receives state subventions. See text accompanying notes 261-75 infra.
84. Compare id. § 24357 (BAAPCD law), with id. § 24225 (county law).
85. Compare id. §§ 24365-65.12 (West 1967 & Supp. 1974) (BAAPCD law)
with §§ 24291-303 (county law). Note that the provisions of sections 24368-68.7 are
absent from county law.
86. Id. § 24369.1 (West Supp. 1974).
in which event the case is dismissed. 7  Further, the BAAPCD hear-
ing board has the authority to issue orders of abatement,"8 while the
county hearing board does not unless the air pollution control board
delegates such power to it.8 9
The Regional Air Pollution Control District
In 1967, at the same time the State Air Resources Board was
created, the legislature established machinery for the formation of re-
gional air pollution control districts. 90 The regional district was a for-
mal recognition of what had been known all along, that is, that air
pollution respects no political boundaries. However, the formation of
such districts is optional with the counties in a particular basin 9' and,
to date, none have been voluntarily formed.
9 2
A regional district can only be formed by agreement between two
or more counties whose boundaries are within one air basin.93  Upon
its own motion the board of supervisors of two or more counties may
vote to form a regional district; on petition of 10 percent of the electo-
rate in each of such counties, the supervisors thereof are required to
hold a hearing to determine whether to become part of a regional dis-
trict. They cannot, however, actually be compelled to join.94
87. Id. at §§ 39261-62 (West 1973). This power is considered such an impedi-
ment to efficient enforcement of air pollution laws in the Bay Area that the District
has been levying civil penalties under the Mulford-Carrell Act rather than under its
own rules and regulations. Recently, a justice court held that that act could not be
used by the BAAPCD, because it applied only to county and regional districts. People
v. Humble Oil & Refining Co. (J. Ct., Benicia Jud. Dist., Solano Cty., 1974) (applying
CAL. HEALTH & S. CODE § 39261 (West 1973) in conjunction with id. § 39005, which
limits "regional district" to those created under part 2 of the Mulford-Carrell Act. Ac-
cording to David Self, former counsel for the BAAPCD, this had the effect of invali-
dating several pending actions and causing procedural delays in others); Telephone In-
terview, May 23, 1974. The BAAPCD has solved the problem by obtaining a change
in the law. Cal. Stat. 1973, ch. 1110, at 2373, amending CAL. HEALTH & S. CODE
§ 39261 (West 1973).
88. CAL. HEALTH & S. CODE § 24368 (West 1967).
89. Id. § 24260.5 (West Supp. 1974).
90. Mulford-Carrell Air Resources Act, Cal. Stat. 1967, ch. 1545, § 5, at 3691,
adding CAL. HEALTH & S. CODE §§ 39300-570 (West 1973).
91. CAL. HEALTH & S. CODE §§ 39350-52 (West 1973). But the legislature
would compel the formation of such a district in the South Coast Air Basin. A.B. 2283
(1973) (vetoed by Governor Reagan).
92. Aside from the BAAPCD the only "regional" district was the ill-fated San
Joaquin Valley Regional Air Pollution COntrol District, created by a special law which
has since been repealed. Cal. Stat. 1959, ch. 1915, at 4486, repealed, Cal. Stat. 1961,
ch. 96, at 1103.
93. See CAL. HEALTH & S. CODE § 39350 (West 1973).
94. Id. §§ 39350-52. The authors are not aware of any such petition ever having
been initiated.
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A number of counties, such as Los Angeles, hesitate to form a
regional district at least in part because of the composition of the air
pollution control board.9 5 That body is set up much as in the Bay
Area District, with equal representation from member counties. 6 Be-
cause of this a large county with more advanced control programs,
larger population, and more sources fears a detrimental loss of control
to the smaller counties.97 If this were the only problem perhaps a
system of weighted votes, such as that permitted under the unified
district law, would provide a solution; but again like the BAAPCD,
one half of the board's membership lies in the cities, with those from
each member county having one vote. 98 There is a certain reluctance
to share with cities the power which presently rests entirely in the
counties.9
In most other respects the regional district, were one established,
would resemble the other districts in that each has an air pollution
control officer, a hearing board, and responsibility for essentially those
matters described in a later section of this article.100 The only other
noteworthy point is that regional districts are also given power to tax,
in much the same way as is the BAAPCD.01
Basinwide Air Pollution Control Coordinating Councils
In 1970, at the time 'the Legislature activated APCDs in all coun-
ties, it mandated the creation of Basinwide Air Pollution Control Co-
ordinating Councils (Basinwide Coordinating Councils). 101  These
bodies are composed of one supervisor from the board of each APCD
wholly or partially within the air basin for which the council is estab-
lished.103
The councils themselves have no direct enforcement powers, no
authority to tax or otherwise raise revenue, nor to compel member
95. Telephone Interview with Robert Barsky, Esq., Deputy Air Pollution Control
Officer, Los Angeles APCD, May 24, 1974 [hereinafter cited as Barsky Interview].
96. Compare CAL. HEALTH & S. CODE § 39360 (West 1973) (regional law), with
id. § 24352 (West Supp. 1974) (BAAPCD law).
97. Barsky Interview, supra note 95.
98. CAL. HEALTH & S. CODE §§ 39355-60 (West 1973).
99. Barsky Interview, supra note 95.
100. CAL. HEALTH & S. CODE §§ 39400-02.1 (West 1973) (air pollution control
officer); id. §§ 39380-90, 39430-509 (powers and duties); id. §§ 39420-21 (hearing
board). Where the county and the BAAPCD laws differ, the regional law follows one
or the other. There is no discernable reason for choosing one over the other in any
particular case.
101. Id. §§ 39521-24.
102. Id. § 39272.
103. Id.
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APCDs to comply with their decisions. However, councils are charged
with one important responsibility: the preparation and maintenance
of a master plan for air quality management in each air basin."' These
implementation plans are discussed below.
Local Authorities
While it might be supposed that the existence of an air pollution
control district in a county pre-empts air quality decisions by local au-
thorities, this is not necessarily the case. Cities and counties may en-
act regulatory ordinances more stringent than those provided in state
law or district regulations, 05 and counties and cities in the BAAPCD
or in any regional district, if formed, may enforce the state air pollu-
tion laws and district rules and regulations. 06  No instance is known
where a city or a county has utilized this option.
The State Air Resources Board
In 1967 the legislature, in the Mulford-Carrell Act,10 7 established
the Air Resources Board (ARB) upon finding that, "It is imperative
to provide a single state agency for administration, research, establish-
ment of standards, and the coordination of air conservation activities
carried on within the state."'' 0 8  The new agency was a recasting of
the existing Motor Vehicle Pollution Control Board, to which was
added the functions of the Bureau of Air Sanitation in the Department
of Public Health and certain additional powers.' 0 9 The ARB was
given authority not only to control vehicular emissions,"10 but also to
establish air basins within the state,"' to set ambient air quality stand-
104. Id. § 39273.
105. Id. §§ 24247, 24360.3, 39057, 39433 (West 1967, 1973 & Supp. 1974). Of
these, only section 39057 subjects local jurisdictions to the prohibitions on banning ag-
ricultural burning, discussed in text accompanying notes 276-307 infra. There is no
apparent explanation for this inconsistency.
106. Id. §§ 24360.3, 39433 (West 1967 & 1973). In other words, the law does
not allow cities to enforce county APCD regulations, another inconsistency.
107. Cal. Stat. 1967, ch. 1545, at 3680.
108. CAL. HEALTH & S. CODE § 39013 (West 1973).
109. Maga Interview, supra note 62. The Motor Vehicle Pollution Control Board
was abolished by CAL. HEALTH & S. CODE § 39064 (West 1973). The Bureau of Air
Sanitation was theoretically left intact; however, most of the personnel of the Bureau
were transferred to the ARB administratively at a later date. Maga Interview, supra
note 62.
110. See generally CAL. HEALTH & S. CODE, div. 26, pt. 1, ch. 4 (West 1973).
This chapter generally carries forward the authority of the Motor Vehicle Pollution
Control Board. Vehicular emissions, while of critical importance, are beyond the scope
of this article, as noted earlier.
111. Id. § 39051(a).
[Vol. 26
September 1974] CALIFORNIA POLLUTION CONTROL LAW
ards,112 conduct research programs, 113 and to cooperate with the fed-
eral government. 1 4  However, "primary" responsibility for stationary
sources, including enforcement of state standards, remained with the
"local and regional authorities."-" 5 Generally this means that while
these latter officials have the basic responsibility for control of emis-
sions from stationary sources, and while many of the day-to-day ac-
tivities of stationary source air pollution control are carried on by such
authorities, the state, in its supervisory capacity, can make demands
on the APCDs in order to achieve air quality standards." 6
The state agency is not organized in the same manner as the air
pollution control districts. Rather the ARB consists essentially of the
Air Resources Board, and the executive officer and his staff." 7 In
addition there exists a hearing ,board for certain matters relating to
vehicles," but it has never been utilized." 9
The Air Resources Board itself is the official governing body of
the agency, although ostensibly the ARB is part of the executive
branch and therefore responsible to the governor through the Re-
sources Agency.'20 The board presently consists of five part-time
paid members, appointed by the governor.' 2'
112. Id. § 39051(b).
113. Id. §§ 39067, 39067.2.
114. Id. §§ 39060-61.
115. Id. § 39012.
116. Discussed more fully in text accompanying notes 233-42 infra.
117. CAL. HA.LTH & S. CODE §§ 39020, 39023 (West 1973).
118. Id. §§ 39190-201.
119. Maga Interview, supra note 65. The hearing board may permit variances
from emission standards for new or used motor vehicles (CAL. HEALTH & S. CODE
§ 39192 (West 1973)), but it shall not function unless California's request for new
vehicle standards has been turned down by the federal government (id. § 39201) pursu-
ant to section 209 (formerly section 208) of the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. 1857f-6(a)
(Supp. 1974). This condition renders the variance board useless, because if a federal
waiver is denied, California will be unable to enforce its new vehicle standards
(Clean Air Act § 209(a), 42 U.S.C. § 1857f-6(a) (Supp. 1974)), and there is no
need for a variance. Even more curious is the apparent intent to allow variances for
used as well as new vehicle standards (CAL. HEALTH & S. CODE § 39192 (West 1973)),
but the condition permitting use of the variance proceeding can only occur when a new
vehicle standard is denied waiver. Code sections 39190-201 should be repealed.
120. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12805 (West Supp. 1974).
121. Id. §§ 39020, 39021.3 (West 1973). Originally the Board consisted of 14
unpaid members: five ex-officio from specific state agencies, and nine public members
appointed by the Governor. The only qualification for appointment of these nine latter
persons was an interest in air pollution control. Cal. Stat. 1967, ch. 1545, at 3681.
This larger group was unwieldy, and it lacked expertise. In 1971 the legislature re-
duced the board to its present five members, who must have specific qualifications: two
persons with training and experience in automotive engineering or closely related fields;
two with training and experience in chemistry, meteorology, or related scientific fields,
The executive officer of the ARB is in a rather unique position,
as any power of the board is "conclusively presumed . . . delegated
to [him] unless it is shown that the board . . . specifically has re-
served the same for its own action."' 22  Since the board has reserved
only certain important matters to itself,'23 much of the routine work
of air pollution control at the state level is conducted by the executive
officer.
The Functional Aspects of Air Pollution Control
The Basic Structure of Air Quality Management
The purpose of this part of the article is to analyze the relation-
ships between the various levels of government responsible for air
quality management in California, as well as the nature of their re-
sponsibilties. While an extended discussion of the federal role in the
total control strategy is beyond the scope of this article, it is important
to place the California program in context with federal law before pro-
ceeding further.
Section 101(a)(3) of the federal Clean Air Act asserts "that the
prevention and control of air pollution at its source is the primary re-
sponsibility of States and local governments .. .. "I4 Nonetheless
the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), administrator of the act,
has made its presence strongly felt in the field. Although the state
network which is the focus of this article forms a solid part of the
mechanics of air quality management, the federal government now
provides considerable direction by (1) setting national ambient air
quality standards for certain air contaminants;' 25 (2) setting emissions
standards for various stationary sources, including those which emit
hazardous pollutants for which an ambient air quality standard has not
been established; 2 6 and (3) approving or disapproving state plans
to achieve federal air quality standrds by 1975 (or, with an extension,
by 1977).127
including agriculture, or law; and one who would qualify under the first category or
who has administrative experience in air pollution control without special technical
training. CAL. HEALTH & S. CODB § 39020 (West 1973). Recently, legislation has
been introduced to increase the board to full-time status. A.B. 2884 (1973); S.B. 1556
(1973). Senate Bill 1556 would also make the ARB an appellate body to review the
decisions of the APCDs.
122. CAL. HEALTH & S. CODE § 39023 (West 1973).
123. See ARB Resolution 72-104 (July 19, 1972).
124. Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1857-57j (Supp. 1974).
125. Id. § 109, 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-4.
126. Id. §§ 111-12, 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-6, 1857c-7.
127. Id. § 110, 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-5.
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However the principal stimuli for federal involvement are new
concepts in air pollution control law contained in the Clean Air Act
Amendments of 1970, and the absolute deadlines in those amend-
ments for achieving the federal standards. The new concepts are:
1. Transportation controls; 12 s
2. Land use planning;
129
3. Consideration of the impact of major sources on air quality,




4. Analysis of the indirect impact of new development caused
by potential increased vehicular miles associated with it;'
3 1
5. Long-range strategies for maintaining air quality once stand-
ards are achieved.'
32
6. Prevention of significant degradation of air quality where it
is better than the standard.
133
These concepts are not expressly contained in California law
128. Id. § 110(a)(2)(B), 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-5(a)(2)(B); 40 C.F.R. § 51.1(n)
(7), 51.14 (1973). EPA's own transportation controls for California include gasoline
rationing (id. § 52.241), limitation on the use of motorcycles (id. § 42.243), exhaust
catalyst retrofit (id. § 42.244), and limitations on parking (id. § 52.247-.251).
129. Clean Air Act § 110(a)(2)(B), 42 U.S.C. § 1857-5(a)(2)(B) (Supp.
1974); 40 C.F.R. § 51.1(n)(9), 51.18 (1973). Note that all of the concepts listed
in the text have some impact on land use planning; see Mandelker & Rothschild, The
Role of Land-Use Controls in Combatting Air Pollution Under the Clean Air Act of
1970, 3 ECoLoGY L.Q. 235 (1973).
130. 40 C.F.R. § 51.18 (1973).
131. Id. The Air Resources Board terms this "negative" land use planning.
132. Clean Air Act § 110(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-5(a)(1) (Supp. 1974); 40
C.F.R. § 51.12(e) (1973). Under this latter section of the Code of Federal Regula-
tions, air quality maintenance areas will be those which have a potential for exceeding
the standards over the next ten years due to growth. The states are required to develop
special plans to prevent this from happening.
133. 38 Fed. Reg. 18986 (1973) (proposed regulations). Although a detailed dis-
cussion of the topic is beyond the scope of this article, it should be noted that a new
dimension to the air quality approach characterized by emissions and performance
standards was enunciated in Sierra Club v. Ruckelshaus, 344 F. Supp. 253, aff'd mem.
by an equally divided Court sub nom., Fri v. Sierra Club, 93 S. Ct. 2770 (1973) (Pow-
ell, J., not participating). The district court had restrained the Administrator of the
EPA from approving any state implementation plan which would permit "significant
deterioration of existing air quality" in areas where air quality is better than existing
standards. Thus, in those areas virtually no new sources can be operated if they alone,
or in combination with other sources, would cause significant deterioration of existing
air quality; in regions such as California's deserts, where little air pollution now exists,
emissions standards would apparently have to be more stringent than those currently
imposed. Essentially, this implies that the once accepted strategy of simply moving
sources from areas with acute air pollution problems to regions without such difficulties
is no longer viable, as it does not resolve the matter, but merely provides short-term
relief and spreads the air pollution around.
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(with the possible exception of maintaining air quality), 34 nor were
they in the ARB's or the APCDs' regulations at the time that the EPA
required them.
Absolute deadlines for achieving air quality are likewise new. Sec-
tion 39051(c) requires the ARB to establish air quality standards, but
neither it nor other sections discussing standards3'3 speak of the time
for attainment. The only possible exception is section 39273, enacted
in 1970, which requires the APCDs in each air basin to create basin-
wide air pollution control plans which must meet or exceed the air
quality standards "within a reasonable time.'
36
Direct federal regulation in California is now a reality because
the state has been unable 37 or unwilling 38  to implement the new
federal control concepts and because the present state program will
not realize several of the federal air quality standards in some air ba-
sins by the July, 1977 deadline.'39
An interesting legal twist in the problem is the EPA's apparent
authority and oft-stated willingness to delegate its powers to state and
134. CAL. HEALTH & S. CODE § 39273 (West 1973) requires, inter alia, the ba-
sinwide plans to be reviewed at least every two years. Presumably this review will be
to maintain air quality once achieved, and to see that where air quality is better than
the standards, it will be prevented from deteriorating to the point where the standards
are not met. In this respect, however, there is nothing indicating that the board and
the APCDs are to keep clean areas already blessed with clean air; for example, sections
39274 and 39276 of the Health and Safety Code speak only of achieving the standards.
However, the authors expect that authority to maintain air quality can be found as a
necessarily implied power in the general grants of authority of the ARB and APCDs.
135. Id. § 39011, 39052(f); CAL. ADM. CODE tit. 17, §§ 70101, 70200.
136. CAL. HEALTH & S. CODE § 39273 (West 1973).
137. For example, the authors believe the ARB and APCDs do not have the au-
thority to regulate traffic to reduce vehicle miles traveled. The Mulford-Carrell Act
persistently speaks of reducing vehicle emissions through emission standards and the
use of devices.
138. For example, the Air Resources Board refused to adopt the EPA approach
to regulating indirect sources (it prefers control of these sources through the land use
planning process (ARB Minutes, April 11, 1974), even though the attorney general
advised in a formal opinion that the APCDs had the authority to control such indirect
sources. Ops. Cal. Att'y. Gen., S.O. 73/43, December 18, 1973.
139. Clean Air Act § 110(e)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-5(e)(1) (Supp. 1974); 40
C.F.R. § 52.222 (1973). The most notable problem is achievement of the federal oxi-
dant standard in the Los Angeles metropolitan area (South Coast Air Basin). The
ARB has said in its implementation plan that an 87% reduction in hydrocarbons over
1970 levels is needed, but only 77% will be achieved by 1977 under its plan. State
of California Implementation Plan for Achieving and Maintaining the National Ambi-
ent Air Quality Standards, Revision 4, at 41 (December 31, 1973). The EPA itself
admits that at least an 80% reduction in miles traveled by gasoline powered vehicles
will be necessary by 1977 to achieve the standard. 38 Fed. Reg. 2195 (1973). This
is to be achieved by gasoline rationing. 40 C.F.R. § 52.241 (1973).
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local agencies when they have not been given any prerogative by their
own legislatures to assume federal power.140  We do not believe that
such authority can be accepted without a legislative act stating that
the agency may accept and implement federal power.141
Programs and Enforcement
Implementation Plans
Pursuant to federal law,142 California has developed an implemen-
tation plan which is ostensibly designed to enable the state to comply
with federal ambient air quality standards. 143  That scheme was in
large part assembled from basinwide implementation plans submitted
to the ARB by the basinwide air pollution control coordinating coun-
cils under a state statute enacted prior to the 1970 amendments to
the Clean Air Act.
144
Under the California legislation, APCDs within each air basin de-
veloped a basinwide air pollution control plan. 14 5 In all except the
Bay Area and San Diego air basins, a group composed of one super-
visor from each county met as the air pollution control coordinating
council'48 and formulated the basinwide plan 47 designed to achieve
140. See, for example, the discussion in the preamble to EPA's indirect source reg-
ulations, 39 Fed. Reg. 7274-75 (1974). There the EPA states that it will delegate its
authority if requested, citing 40 C.F.R. § 50.02(d) (1973). However, the authors be-
lieve that this regulation, as interpreted by the EPA, is not supported by the Clean
Air Act, because no specific authority can be found therein. Such power can be seen
in certain limited areas relating to standards of performance for new stationary sources
(Clean Air Act § 111(c)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-6(c)(1) (Supp. 1974)), and to stand-
ards for hazardous pollutants (id. at § 112(d)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-7(d)(1)); but
the APCDs have authority to regulate the sources and emissions contemplated by these
special programs, so delegation is not needed.
141. A fundamental principle of law is that an administrative agency has only that
power directly or impliedly granted by its legislative body. 2 CAL. Jun. 3d, Adminis-
trative Law § 36 (1973). The legislature has not granted the ARB or the APCDs
prerogative to assume federal powers, and therefore it is felt that they cannot do so.
But see 2 ANTrAu, MUNIcIPAL C oRPORATION LAW, INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS
§ 19A.08 (1973).
142. Clean Air Act § I10(a), 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-5(a) (1970).
143. State of California Implementation Plan for Achieving and Maintaining the
National Ambient Air Quality Standards (January 30, 1972). This Plan is constantly
being amended, formally (Revisions 1-4) and informally by submission to and approval
by the EPA of compliance schedules for noncomplying sources.
144. CAL. HEALTH & S. CODE §§ 39270-76 (West 1973). The Clean Air Act
amendments were signed into law December 31, 1970. It was fortuitous that state
planning dove-tailed with the federal timetable. Maga Interview, supra note 62.
145. CAL. HEALTH & S. CODE § 39273 (West 1973).
146. See text accompanying notes 102-04 supra.
147. CAL. HEALTH & S. CODE § 39272 (West 1973).
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state air quality standards. The proposals were then filed with the
ARB in late 1971."4 Each county APCD was to file a county pro-
gram to implement the basin plan, but few did so, relying on what was
already in the basinwide design. 14 9
These plans have probably provided the incentive for many coun-
ties to evolve adequate programs for air pollution control, which might
not have occurred from only the activation of districts by state law.1 0
The prime impetus was and is that if any plan or program will not
achieve the ambient air quality standards for the air basin, the ARB
is directed to promulgate one that will meet those criteria. 5 ' More-
over, if any APCD fails to enforce its plan or program, the ARB may
step in and do so.'52 The ARB has, therefore, a most effective tool
to compel proper enforcement of adequate regulations. This scheme
has proved more effective than prior supervisory powers' 53 because
it not only forced the APCD to plan, but it also made the ARB
examine those plans, the sources of pollution and existing and pro-
jected air quality in each area. 5 4 The basinwide plans must be re-
viewed upon the request of any APCD within a basin, or upon request
of the ARB, but in no case at intervals greater than every two years. 155
Standards
There are, as one might be able to gather from earlier discussion,
a number of different types of standards for the regulation of air pollu-
tion in California.
Ambient air quality standards really require little further discus-
sion; from a technical standpoint they are interesting, but from a legal
view they are rather straightforward. Standards specifying emission
limits are another matter, and much more interesting from a legal per-
spective.
Some criteria are set forth in the general law. They consist of
(1) a standard for opacity of smoke, the Ringelmann scale,"" (2) a
148. Id. § 39273.
149. Wong-Woo Interview, supra note 42.
150. Id. Regarding activation of the districts, see text accompanying note 8 supra.
151. CAL. HEALTH & S. CODE § 39274-75 (West 1973).
152. Id. § 39274.
153. See text accompanying notes 233-42 infra.
154. Wong-Woo Interview, supra note 42.
155. CAL. HEALTH & S. CODE § 39273 (West 1973).
156. Id. § 24242, 39077.1 (West 1967 & 1973). Certain exemptions for fires set
pursuant to orders of fire prevention and fire-fighting personnel, and for some agricul-
tural operations, are contained in id. §§ 24245, 24251, 39077.4-.5 (West 1967 & 1973).
Inexplicably the exceptions are not the same.
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public nuisance provision, 1 7 and (3) certain smoke opacity and dis-
charge requirements for motor vehicles. 158 The APCDs have primary
responsibility for enforcement of all such regulations,' except for
highway administration of smoke provisions by the California Highway
Patrol.
Air pollution control districts may, however, set more stringent
standards than those contained in state law,160 and may, in addition,
impose specific emissions criteria for various sources.' 6 ' A number
of districts have exercised this power by setting the Ringelmann stand-
ard at number 1, or 20 percent opacity.' 62 However, APCO authority
to impose more stringent standards probably does not extend to the
Vehicle Code.'0 3
Both the Ringelmann and the nuisance standards are rules of a
general nature. More precise, and much more technically complex,
are the emission standards promulgated by the districts. The Los An-
geles APCD has, for example, Rule 52 for particulate matter, set pur-
suant to rather sophisticated calculations. 0 4 Most such standards have
been accepted both by the state and by the EPA.0 5
Enforcement
There exists a variety of remedies for past or prospective viola-
tions of state law or district rules and regulations relating to air pollu-
tion. These can generally be classified as administrative, civil, and
criminal. In addition, certain enforcement powers are vested in city
and county governments, and in the attorney general.
Administrative
There are two enforcement tools at the administrative level: the
order of abatement and the permit system. The order of abatement
157. Id. §§ 24243, 39077 (West 1967 & 1973). Again, there are inconsistent ex-
ceptions. Id. §§ 24251.1, 39077.4-.5 (West 1967 & 1973).
158. CAL. VEH. CODE §§ 27153, 27153.5 (West Supp. 1974).
159. CAL. HEALTH & S. CODE § 39012 (West 1973).
160. Id. § 39057.
161. Id. §§ 24260, 24362, 39460, 39012 (West 1967, 1973 & Supp. 1974).
162. E.g., Rules and Regulations, County of Los Angeles Air Pollution Control
District, rule 50 (undated).
163. Letter from Evelle J. Younger, Attorney General, to Assemblyman Peter
Schabarum, February 17, 1972 (Attorney General No. IL 72-37, formerly No. SO
71/40).
164. Rules and Regulations, County of Los Angeles Air Pollution Control District,
rule 52 (undated).
165. Wong-Woo Interview, supra note 42.
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is available in all air pollution control districts.' 66 It merely directs
a polluter to abate a violation. At least in the Bay Area, a person
subject to an order is given a reasonable time, often thirty days, to
achieve compliance.
67
The order may be issued, after notice and hearing, by either the
air pollution control board or the hearing board, but in county districts
the hearing board may not so act unless authorized by the control
board. 68 The violation may be of specified statutes, such as the nui-
sance or Ringelmann laws, or of any rule or regulation prohibiting or
limiting the discharge of contaminants into the air. 169 In the Bay Area
and regional districts, the hearing board must find, in addition to a
violation of state law or district rules and regulations, "that no variance
is justified and that a reasonable time has been allowed for compliance
"170
County law is strangely silent as to how an order for abatement
is to be framed. The BAAPCD and regional law, however, provide
that "[tihe order for abatement shall be framed in the manner of a
166. CAL. HEALTH & S. CODE §§ 24260.5, 24354, 24368, 39391, 39502 (West
1967, 1973 & Supp. 1974).
167. Id. § 24368.3 (West 1967). See id. § 39505 (West 1973) (the comparable
regional statute).
168. The abatement order law is another example of the confusing and conflicting
provisions often found in the state's air pollution control statutes. Abatement order
authority (id. § 24368) was first given to the hearing board of the BAAPCD in 1961
and civil penalties were not available. When the Mulford-Carrell Act was passed in
1967, regional hearing boards were given the same power, and the provisions were
made essentially identical to those in the BAAPCD law. Compare id. §§ 24368-68.7,
with id. §§ 39502-09 (West 1973). Cal. Stat. 1970, ch. 694 at 1323 gave the air pollu-
tion control boards in each kind of district the power to issue orders of abatement, and
the further authority to delegate this prerogative to the hearing boards. Id. §§ 24260.5,
24354.15 and 39391 (West 1973 & Supp. 1974). The same act added the $6,000 per
day civil penalty. Id. § 39260. There was no amendment to the earlier sections, but
there should have been. For example, one question left unresolved is whether the hear-
ing boards of the BAAPCD and regional districts can issue orders of abatement with-
out a directive from the control boards, per the 1970 law. Can the $6,000 per day
penalty be imposed in these districts if the control boards have not made the delega-
tion, or if the hearing board expressly acts under its original authority (per section
39260, the $6,000 penalty only applies to the abatement order issued under the later
sections)? The BAAPCD and regional statutes contain specific criteria, under the pre-
1970 sections, for issuing orders, and also precise procedures, but these are totally lack-
ing in the county law. Can these specifics be implied in the latter law? While politi-
cal necessities and compromises often led to the conflicts in the air pollution laws, at
least some of them could have been avoided with better draftsmanship.
169. Id. §§ 24260.5, 24368, 39391 (West 1967, 1973 & Supp. 1974).
170. Id. §§ 24368, 39502 (West 1967 & 1973).
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writ or injunction" and may "require a respondent to refrain from a
particular act unless certain conditions are met."
'171
Orders are not self-executing--enforcement lies in the courts.'72
In all districts violation of an order may be remedied by mandatory
or prohibitory injunction, and an intentional or negligent breach may
lead to a civil penalty of up to $6,000 for each day that the violation
occurs.1 7 3  In county and regional districts, contravention of an order
is also a misdemeanor.
17 4
Although the order for abatement would seem to be an expedi-
tious method of cutting off violations of emission standards, it has re-
ceived little use by the districts, other than the BAAPCD. The Los
Angeles APCD, in particular, has recently been criticized for its fail-
ure to utilize the sanction. 7 5  Use of the abatement order is desirable
because its initiation need not depend on crowded court dockets.
Moreover, except for injunctions, it may be more effective because
of the relatively large penalties involved as compared with the $500
maximum fines in direct civil or criminal actions (incarceration is sel-
dom imposed as a criminal penalty).1 76  Its disadvantages are that the
hearing board may not be capable of spending the time on potentially
protracted litigation, and such proceedings may delay getting into
court.
One of the most effective mechanisms to insure compliance with
applicable standards has proven to be the permit system. 71 7  The Los
Angeles APCD has made extensive use of this procedure since its in-
ception.17  All other districts, including the Bay Area APCD,17 9 now
171. Id.
172. Id. § 39077.7 (West 1973). See also §§ 24369.6 (West 1967) (BAAPCD);
id. § 39508 (West 1973) (regional).
173. Id. § 39260.
174. Id. §§ 24261, 39438 (West 1967 & 1973).
175. See Am REsoutcEs BOARD, FINAL REPORT, INVEsTIGATION OF THE Los AN-
GELES AIR PoLLuTnoN CONTROL DisTucT 51 (1973) [hereinafter cited as FINAL
REPORT].
176. See text accompanying notes 186-96 infra.
177. CAL. HEALTH & S. CODE § 24263 (West 1967). "The air pollution control
board may require by regulation that before any person either builds, erects, alters, re-
places, operates, sells, rents or uses any article, machine, equipment, or other contriv-
ance specified by such regulation the use of which may cause the issuance of air con-
taminants, such person shall obtain a permit to do so from the air pollution control
officer." Id.
178. Kennedy, supra note 21; see, e.g., Los Angeles County Air Pollution Control
District Rule 10 (undated).
179. Bay Area Air Pollution Control District Regulation 2 §§ 1300-02 (10th rev.
March, 1973). Note that while there exists no express statutory authority in the
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
have a permit system in operation so that the state will be in compli-
ance with the EPA requirements. 180
Most APCDs divide their permit system in two-the authority to
construct, and the permit to operate. The former is issued after a
review of plans persuades the APCO's staff that emission limits will
likely be met; the latter after the source is in operation, and the staff
is satisfied that the source does in fact meet the standards.''
The permit system has a number of features which make it an
attractive enforcement tool. First, it provides an efficient way to ob-
tain source data, for if the operator of a source refuses to furnish infor-
mation, the air pollution control officer may suspend his permit.
182
Second, it is a misdemeanor to operate without such a permit.8 3
Third, if the air pollution control officer suspects a violation of any
standard, rule, or regulation, he may ask the hearing board to deter-
mine, after public hearing, whether to revoke the permit.18 1 Within
thirty days after the complaint the hearing board must hold a hearing
to rule on the case, after which it may revoke the permit, find that
no violation exists, continue the suspension, or grant a variance.s 5
Finally, the continued effectiveness of the permit system comes
mainly from the fact that, once it is established and applied to exist-
ing sources, all future construction or modification of pollution sources
within a district must receive prior APCD approval of plans and opera-
tion; the burden of going forward lies with the source, not the APCD.
No other procedure has been found which obliges the polluter to seek
consent and prove compliance.
General Civil Sanctions
All air pollution control districts have the power to seek injunc-
BAAPCD's enabling act, the attorney general has opined that such power is implicit
in the general rule-making authority of the district. See note 80 supra.
180. 40 C.F.R. § 51.18 (1973).
181. See Los Angeles Air Pollution Control District Rule 10 (undated). Note
that when the system first went into effect in Los Angeles, blanket permits were
granted; then, pursuant to Health and Safety Code section 24274, the air pollution con-
trol officer acted to obtain various data from source operators which were used (a)
in criminal prosecutions, and (b) to suspend permits. See Kennedy, supra note 21.
182. CAL. HEALTH & S. CODE § 24270 (West 1967). The permittee may there-
after request a public hearing before the hearing board for reinstatement of the permit.
Id. § 24271.
183. Id. § 24278-79. This is true in all districts except the BAAPCD; see id.
§§ 24362.5-62.7.
184. Id. 9§ 24274-76 (West 1967 & Supp. 1974).
185. Id. § 24276 (West Supp. 1974). Variances are discussed in text accompany-
ing notes 198-217 infra.
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tions for any violation of state law or of the rules and regulations of
the district.18  To obtain such relief, "the plaintiff shall not be required
to allege facts necessary to show or tending to show lack of adequate
remedy at law or to show or tending to show irreparable damage or
loss.1'1 s  The diminished proof requirements would seem to make in-
junctive relief an attractive remedy.
There are, in addition to the $6,000 fines for violation of orders
of abatement discussed above, civil penalties for violating laws and
regulations when the order of abatement procedure is not used.18
However, the fine is only $500 per day.'89 In determining the amount
of the penalty, the court is directed to consider all relevant informa-
tion, including "the extent of the harm caused by the violation, the
nature and persistence of the violation, the length of time over which
the violation occurred, and corrective action, if any, taken' by the
polluter.'9 0
Criminal Sanctions
Misdemeanor penalties are generally available to county and re-
gional air pollution control districts for violations of statutory nuisance
and Ringelmann provisions, and for infractions of district rules and
regulations. 191 In county districts, violation of certain aspects of the
permit system may be punished as a misdemeanor. 9 2  Infringement
186. Id. §§ 24252, 24360.7, 39437 (West 1973 & Supp. 1974).
187. Id.
188. Id. § 39261 (West 1973).
189. Id. This law was passed in 1970. Cal. Stat. 1970, ch. 694 § 4, at 1324.
However, the BAAPCD could obtain $500 forfeitures beginning in 1968. Cal. Stat.
1968, ch. 747, § 2, at 1449, adding CAL. HEALTH & S. CODE § 24369 (West Supp.
1974).
190. CAL. HEALTH & S. CODE § 39262 (West 1973). At one time, the Bay Area
District had to follow a rather cumbersome procedure to recover $500 "forfeitures" un-
der sections 24369 to 24369.3. This came into play upon any violation of the state Ring-
elmann standard or statutory nuisance provisions, or of Regulation 2 of the BAAPCD
(applying to "incineration, salvage, heat transfer, general combustion and general opera-
tions"). If the APCO found that such a breach had occurred, he could instruct the
district's counsel to file a civil action for recovery of the penalty. The unique feature
of the system was that the hearing board could step in to review the case, pursuant
to section 24369.1. If, after a hearing, the board found that a violation existed, the
prosecution would continue, but if the body found no such breach or that the violation
was "justifiable," it had to order the action dismissed. Moreover, under that same sec-
tion, if the board found that a variance was justified, it could proceed to issue such
variance at that time. To avoid this entanglement, the BAAPCD utilized the general
provision for fines in section 39261; when this was ruled improper by a Solano County
justice court, the District obtained a change in the law. See note 87 supra.
191. CAL. HEALTH & S. CODE §§ 24253, 24281, 39438 (West 1967 & 1973).
192. Id. §§ 24277-80, 24282 (West 1967). Construction, alteration, replacement,
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of the general prohibition against open burning is also punishable as
a misdemeanor, 193 and any person who knowingly sets or permits agri-
cultural burning without the requisite permit is likewise guilty of a mis-
meanor.1
9 4
As noted earlier, 19 5 in Bay Area law criminal sanctions were, un-
til quite recently, notably absent from all but the open burning sec-
tions, a fact which was reflected in that district's preference for the
civil sanction as an enforcement tool. 9 ' This has been altered to give
the Bay Area the same powers in this context as the counties. 9T
The Variance
As might be expected, the legislature has provided a mechanism
to relieve polluters from the extraordinary hardship sometimes caused
by the operations of state law, or district rules and regulations. x9 s A
former superior court judge, who was the first chairman of the Los
Angeles Air Pollution Control District's hearing board, has classified
cases wherein a variance is justified as those in which: (1) the equip-
ment in question is issued only in emergency situations; (2) a variance
is needed to permit the source operator to conduct experiments to de-
termine what devices will be necessary to solve his air pollution prob-
lem; (3) the industry is operating during the time installation of con-
trol equipment is taking place; (4) the best equipment known to
date, which has been installed at the source, is not sufficient to bring
the source into compliance with standards; and (5) the financial sit-
uation of the industry (mostly very small enterprises) is such as to
preclude immediate installation of equipment, and time is needed to
enable the source to secure equipment financing.' 99 The first three
grounds seem reasonable on their facts; the fourth and fifth perhaps
less so. Following Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City of Detroit20 0
or use of a source of air contaminants without a permit, for example, is a violation.
A permittee's failure to furnish information upon request of an air pollution control
officer is also a crime, as is knowing falsification of any material so requested. Use,
alteration, replacement, or construction of a source for which a permit has been sus-
pended or revoked is also a misdemeanor.
193. Id. §§ 39296-96.1 (West 1973).
194. Id. § 39298.1(a).
195. See note 81 & accompanying text supra.
196. See Walker, supra note 8.
197. See note 81 & accompanying text supra.
198. CAL. HEALTH & S. CODE §§ 24291-303, 24365-65.12, 39470-82 (West 1967,
1973 & Supp. 1974).
199. Walker, The Air Pollution Control Hearing Board-Functions and Jurisdic-
tions, 27 S. CAL. L. REV. 399, 402-03 (1954).
200. 362 U.S. 440 (1960).
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it is fairly certain that a state can require compliance even though the
"state of the art" is not sufficiently advanced to permit a particular
source to conform. Thus, California could constitutionally require
compliance in the fourth instance; the same may be true of the fifth
situation. In any event, California has chosen not to adopt the more
stringent position.
In order to grant a variance the hearing board must find, after
properly noticed public hearing,210 that the source is violating a statu-
tory standard or a rule or regulation of an air pollution control district,
and
b) That, due to conditions beyond the reasonable control of the
petitioner, requiring compliance would result in either (1) an
arbitrary or unreasonable taking of property, or (2) the prac-
tical closing and elimination of a lawful business.
(c) That such closing or taking would be without a corresponding
benefit in reducing air contaminants.
2 02
As is evident from the use of the words "reasonable control," "arbi-
trary and unreasonable taking," and "without corresponding benefit,"
there is a great deal of discretion vested in the hearing board. In
some cases the equities are fairly clear, but in others there are subtle
values to be weighed.
If the hearing board finds that a variance is justified, it must then
decide what other conditions to impose upon the source, e.g. time
limits for compliance, alternative standards, and the like.20 - The ap-
plicable statute provides for the exercise of broad discretion by the
board in balancing the equities in each situation: "the advantages to
the residents of the district from the reduction of air contaminants and
the disadvantages to any otherwise lawful business, occupation, or ac-
tivity" that would result from the application of contemplated require-
ments.2 °4 Thus, again, the hearing board is given a free hand in the
solution of what are often very complex problems. In addition, var-
201. CAL. H.ALTH & S. CODE § 24295, 24365.4, 39474, as amended, Cal. Stat.
1972, ch. 950, at 1710. These amendments provide for better public noticing of vari-
ance hearings. In the past notice was required to be sent only to the applicant and
to the air pollution control officer; it must now be sent to every daily newspaper within
the county (or counties, in the case of regional districts and the BAAPCD) in which
the district is operating. At hearings on this bill (A.B. 1084)) it was argued that the
change would lead to a desirable increase in public participation in the important work
of the hearing board.
202. CAL. HuLTH & S. CODE H9 24296.5, 24365.5, 39475.5 (West 1967, 1973 &
Supp. 1974).
203. Id. H9 24297, 24365.5, 39476.
204. Id.
iances may be revoked or modified by the board upon a properly no-
ticed hearing, at which there is a reconsideration of the above-men-
tioned guidelines.20
A number of procedural changes have recently been made in the
variance laws,200 principally to meet certain requirments of federal
regulations. °  The most significant alterations are: (1) notices of
hearings must be given thirty days in advance; 20 8 (2) each variance
must have a final compliance date;20 9 (3) each variance exceeding
one year must have increments of progress 210 (dates on which mile-
stones of progress can be measured); (4) compliance schedules must
be developed for regulations enacted, but not yet effective;2 1' and (5)
the compliance schedules must be submitted to the ARB212 for for-
warding to EPA for approval.21 3  As to the last matter, the former
law gave ARB no formal mechanism to review variances unless they
continued for longer than a year.214 Now, not only must variances
be sent to the ARB,2 5 but the ARB can modify or revoke them.210
While this new law probably improves variance procedure, it also has
created bureaucratic paper shuffling, viz., from the APCD to the ARB
to the EPA and back down again.
One final power is worthy of mention: if the hearing board finds
that certain work is needed to bring equipment in line with standards,
or that contemplated action requires additional time, it may now re-
quire a performance bond from the source operator. This bond will
205. Id. § 24298-99, 24365.6-65.7, 39477-78.
206. Cal. Stat. 1974, ch. 172, §§ 1-32, (West Cal. Legis. Service 416-26) (Apr.
17, 1974).
207. 40 C.F.R. §§ 51.4(a), 51.15 (1973).
208. CAL. HEALTH & S. CODE H9 24295, 24365.4, 39474 (West 1967, 1973 & Supp.
1974).
209. Id. §§ 24301, 24365.10, 39480.
210. Id.
211. Id. H§ 24304, 24365.13, 39483.
212. Id. §§ 24303, 24365.12, 39482.
213. 40 C.F.R. § 51.15(a) (2) (1973).
214. CAL. HEALTH & S. CODE §§ 24303, 24365.12, 39482, enacted by Cal. Stat.
1972, ch. 1552, §§ 11, 21, 37, at 3167-68, 3174 (1972), repealed by Cal. Stat. 1974,
ch. 172, §§ 7, 17, 28 (West Cal. Legis. Service 418, 422, 425) (Apr. 17, 1974).
215. CAL. HEALTH & S. CODE §§ 24303, 24365.12, 39482 (West 1973 & Supp.
1974), added by Cal. Stat. 1974, ch. 172, §§ 8, 18, 29.
216. Cal. Stat. 1974, ch. 172 (West Cal. Legis. Service 416) (Apr. 17, 1974),
amending CAL. HEALTH & S. CODE § 39054.2 (West 1973). Under the prior law, en-
acted in 1971, the ARB could revoke any variance, assuming it could find out about it
if not reported (see text accompanying note 214 supra) if the increase in contaminants
outweighed the economic loss from revocation. This power to revoke was never exer-
cised.
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be forfeited to the district should the agreed upon work not be fin-
ished, unless the surety itself agrees to undertake the job, in which
case it retains the funds.217
APCD Enforcement Tools Compared
The variance enforcement tools are utilized to different degrees.
The permit system is in effect in every district, due to federal man-
date. The criminal sanctions are widely used, probably because the
Los Angeles APCD has had such success with them for so many
years.21 s  This penalty makes the fewest demands on the APCD staff
and hearing board. Although the $500 civil fine should be no more
laborious, it is not used extensively by any district except the Bay
Area.
21 9
The abatement order, in contrast, places time ,burdens on staff
and either the control board or hearing board, and court action may
still be required to enforce the order.
The injunction is the ultimate weapon when all else fails, but it
is undoubtedly more complex than the other procedures and makes
substantial demands on staff and counsel. Also, the control board is
likely to want to approve each injunctive action, for this traditionally
extraordinary remedy may have political implications. During a pe-
riod of three years the Los Angeles APCD used injunctive relief only
six times.22 °
While the criminal sanction remains the most widely used method
of enforcement, the authors believe that reliance on it may be mis-
placed. Arguments that criminal sanctions have inherent deterrent ef-
fects can be countered by a demonstration that the civil penalties avail-
able to APCDs are never less than the misdemeanor fine, and for vio-
lation of an abatement order they are considerably more.22' Of course
217. CAL. HEALTH & S. CODE §§ 24297, 24365.5, 39476 (West 1967 & 1973).
218. Telephone Interview with J.W. Whitsett, Deputy County Counsel, Los Ange-
les County, May 28, 1974 [hereinafter cited as Whitsett Interview]. Mr. Whitsett be-
lieves criminal provisions are effective on opacity violations of the one-shot kind, which
comprise the preponderance of LAAPCD's infractions. A citation often brings compli-
ance or a petition for a variance.
219. Interview with James J. Morgester, ARB Senior Air Pollution Operations
Specialist, in Sacramento, California, May 24, 1974 [hereinafter cited as Morgester
Interview].
220. FINAL REPORT, supra note 175, at 51-52.
221. The standard misdemeanor penalty in California is a maximum of 6 months
imprisonment or $500 fine, or both. CAL. PEN. CODE § 19 (West 1970). Compare
this with the maximum $500 per day civil penalty contained in CAL. HEALTH & S. CODE
§ 24369 (West Supp. 1974) and the maximum $6,000 per day civil penalty available
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there is the threat of jail terms, but there are few cases in which incar-
ceration has been imposed upon a defendant, 222 perhaps because cor-
porations are most often the accused. One might question the efficacy
of a criminal sanction against a corporation, unless penalties against
the officers are specially available and readily obtainable.
It should also be pointed out that there are a number of impor-
tant procedural objections to criminal remedies. Most of the problems
traditionally associated with criminal actions are present: the burden
of proof is higher; unanimity of jury verdict (at least in California)
is a consideration; and criminal statutes and regulations must be drawn
with a certainty some argue is not desirable in a technically complex
and rapidly changing area such as air pollution control.2 23  Moreover,
it has been contended that it is difficult to present technical issues to
a jury; it is much easier, and thus more efficient, to submit the case
to a panel of experts such as those on the hearing board, seeking the
issuance of orders for abatement. Further, it is argued, if injunction
or even civil penalties were sought, a judge could weigh the equities
involved to fashion a more appropriate remedy than the black-and-white
determination of guilt/innocence that accompanies the criminal pen-
alty.2 2
4
There are, in addition, some nice constitutional issues raised by
the use of criminal sanctions.225 If, for example, information were
obtained from a source operator under threat of misdeamnor penalty,
there is a question as to whether use of that evidence in a subsequent
criminal action would constitute self-incrimination in violation of the
Fifth Amendment.2
under id. § 39260 (West 1973). Legislation has been introduced to provide an incre-
mental increase for subsequent civil violations; although it was defeated in the Sen-
ate, reconsideration was granted on February 27, 1974. A.B. 2284 (1973).
222. Morgester Interview, supra note 219.
223. Walker, supra note 8, at 85.
224. Id. at 87, and Walker Interview, supra note 79. In many cases defendants
plead nolo contendere to avoid the time and trouble of trial, and the stigma of a crim-
inal guilty plea or conviction; the court then weighs the equities in determining the
amount of the penalty. Whitsett Interview, supra note 196.
225. Walker Interview, supra note 79.
226. Following Shapiro v. United States, 335 U.S. 1 (1948), it appears that rec-
ords required to be kept, pursuant to a regulatory statute, for filing with a governmental
agency can be used in subsequent criminal prosecutions. In 1968, however, the Court
cast a new light on this area in Marchetti v. United States, when it reversed the de-
fendant's conviction under federal gambling registration laws, noting three distinguish-
ing factors between the two cases. 390 U.S. 39 (1968). First, in Shapiro the defend-
ant was ordered to keep more or less customary records under the Emergency Price
Control Act, while in Marchetti the registration was unrelated to wagering records.
[Vol. 26
September 1974] CALIFORNIA POLLUTION CONTROL LAW 141
Further, following the decisions of the United States Supreme
Court in Camara v. Municipal Court227 and See v. City of Seattle228
searches in business establishments of areas not open to the public
have been prohibited without a warrant; thus, information so obtained
would be inadmissible in a criminal action.229 At first these cases
caused some consternation among those charged with the administra-
tion of air pollution laws, 230 but in California, at least, this problem
has been obviated by the statutory administrative search warrant pro-
visions.231  At any rate, these cases will now need to be re-evaluated
in light of the recent case of Air Pollution Variance Board v. Western
Alfalfa Corp.
232
The Air Resources Board's Role in Enforcement
As noted earlier, the function of the board is essentially to over-
see standard-setting and enforcement operations of the districts.233 As
a corollary to this, statutory provisions state that enforcement activities
Second, the records in Shapiro had a "public" aspect to them, while gambling registra-
tion, even when required by statute, is not that kind of "public" activity. Third, the
records themselves in Shapiro did not concern criminal activity, but ordinary day-to-
day business; in Marchetti, since gambling itself is unlawful, records surrounding it
dealt with an inherently illegal area.
The impact of these cases on air pollution records is unclear, but a strong argu-
ment could be made that the Shapiro rationale governs the situation. Emissions rec-
ords are essentially production records of the type customarily kept by an industry;
hence, the first point of Marchetti would not be met. Since these records would be
kept pursuant to state law and APCD regulation, they are "public" in the Shapiro
sense, and similarly distinguishable from Marchetti. Moreover, production records do
not involve inherently criminal activity, so the third objection of the Marchetti Court
seems to be met.
227. 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
228. 387 U.S. 541 (1967).
229. Moreover, it seems likely that proceedings to recover a penalty or forfeiture
would be deemed "quasi-criminar' in nature, so the exclusionary rule would also apply.
See, e.g., Annot., 5 A.L.R.3d 670 (1966). This seems analogous to proceedings for
forfeiture of a vehicle, treated in People v. One 1960 Cadillac Coupe, 62 Cal. 2d 92,
96, 396 P.2d 706, 709, 41 Cal. Rptr. 290, 293 (1964).
230. See, e.g., Mix, The Misdemeanor Approach to Air Pollution Control, 10 ARiz.
L. REV. 90, 95 (1968). See also, Mulchay, Camara and See: A Constitutional Problem
with Effect on Air Pollution Control, 10 ARiz. L. REv. 120 (1968).
231. CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. §§ 1822.50-.57 (West 1972).
232. 42 U.S.L.W. 4756 (U.S. May 20, 1974). Essentially, the opinion applies the
"open fields" doctrine of Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57 (1924), to smoke opacity
tests conducted by a state health inspector on respondent's outdoor premises. Finding
no violation of the Fourth Amendment, Justice Douglas stated that the inspector had
"sighted what anyone in the city who was near the plant could see-plumes of smoke"
and that the "invasion of privacy. . . if it can be said to exist, is abstract and theoreti-
cal." id. at 4757.
233. CAL. HEALTH & S. CODE §§ 39012, 39052(f), 39054, 39274-75 (West 1973).
are to be undertaken by the ARB only after a public hearing has been
held to determine whether "local or regional authorities have failed
to meet their responsibilities pursuant to [Division 26 of the Health and
Welfare Code]," and the board has thereafter so decided.
2 34
The principal and most direct method whereby the ARB can en-
force air pollution control laws or the rules and regulations of
an APCD is by assuming the powers of the district.235  If the board
finds that the local regulations are insufficient to achieve applicable
air quality standards, it may adopt adequate ones which the district
must administer. 6  If the ARB finds that reasonable action to exe-
cute any basinwide coordinated plan has not been taken in a district
it "may take any appropriate legal action to enforce any such plan,
including the emission standards and enforcement procedures
therein. "237 Or if it finds that a district's implementation program de-
signed to carry out the plan will not achieve the air quality standards
established for the basin, or if no program is submitted, the ARB may
exercise the powers of the county air pollution control district.238
Pursuant to 1972 amendments to the law, before the ARB can
act it must hold a public hearing, upon thirty days written notice to
the district and the basinwide coordinating council. 9 If there is "an
imminent and substantial endangerment to the health of persons, and
. . . the districts affected are not taking reasonable action," the ARB
may give as little as twenty-four hours notice, and that may be oral,
if necessary.240 These amendments greatly streamlined a time con-
suming notice and investigation procedure24' which had proven to be
of little use in correcting unacceptable practices of APCDs.242
The board has commenced proceedings under these provisions
in a number of cases throughout the state.2 43  Most often, once the
APCD in question and the polluter causing the problem learn of the
board's threat to intervene, compliance is obtained in due course with
234. Id. § 39012.
235. Id. §§ 39052(f), 39274, 39275.
236. Id. § 39052(f).
237. Id. § 39274.
238. Id. § 39275.
239. Id. § 39054, as amended, Cal. Stat. 1972, ch. 806, at 1433. This amendment
controls the procedure to be followed in actions pursuant to sections 39052(f), 39274,
and 39275 of the Health and Safety Code, cited in note 235 supra.
240. CAL. HEALTH & S. CODE § 39054 (West 1973).
241. Cal. Stat. 1968, ch. 764, § 8, at 1466, as amended, CAL. HEALTH & S. CODE
§ 39054 (West 1973).
242. Maga Interview, supra note 62.
243. Id.
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no actual assumption of authority by the board.244  For example, a
plant in San Benito County was virtually uncontrolled; its white plume
could often be seen for miles. Some local ranchers complained of
the dust on the ground. The board put the APCD on notice, and
as a result a variance was requested. The variance was granted but
the ARB continued to apply pressure because the compliance schedule
was inadequate. Finally, the company announced its plans to abandon
the old plant and to build a new one. The board continued to apply
pressure, and a specific time table was established, which was accept-
able to the Board. Ultimately the company abandoned the new plant
and closed the old one.245
A more difficult case was presented by a steel plant in San Ber-
nardino County. The first formal action of the board was an extensive
investigation of the multitude of complex sources at the plant; this re-
sulted in a 156-page report.246  Some sources had been controlled,
but many had not. The staff, at board direction, met frequently with
the APCD and the owner, and continued to assert that sufficient cor-
rective action had not taken place. Notable improvements were un-
dertaken, but some sources are still on variance, and the ARB (and
now EPA) continues to work on the matter; there are some specific
operations for which control technology is still not available.1
47
In both of these cases compliance was slow because control was
difficult and/or expensive on old equipment. Closing the plants would
have caused severe economic hardship to the communities involved.
The hearing boards when granting variances, and hence the ARB when
considering exercising its own authority, must take such economic im-
pact into account.
2 48
Many investigations by the board involve burning of wood waste
in northern California. In these cases, technology for control is
usually available at a reasonable cost; enforcement may be lacking be-
cause the APCDs were slow to develop effective programs, and be-
cause local officials may not be anxious to cause any considerable hard-
ship to important sources of employment.24
244. Id.
245. Wong-Woo Interview, supra note 42; CALnORNIA Am REsouRcEs BOARD,
STATUS OF PORTLAND CEMENT PLANTS IN CALIFORNIA, at 24-27 (1973).
246. CALIFORNIA Am RESOURCES BOARD, SURVEY OF AIR POLLUTION FROM THE
KAISER STEEL PLANT, FONTANA, CALIFORNIA (1971).
247. Wong-Woo Interview, supra note 42.
248. CAL. HEALTH & S. CODE §§ 24296.5, 24297, 24365.5, 24365.6, 39475.5,
39476 (West 1967, 1973 & Supp. 1974).
249. Morgester Interview, supra note 219.
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The cases that the ARB examines usually involve specific
sources, and do not entail an overall review of the APCD's rules and
enforcement practices. The most notable exception is the ARB's in-
vestigation of the Los Angeles APCD. Two individuals had compiled
extensive data which they considered to be evidence of deficient rules
and lax enforcement procedures. A formal petition was filed with the
ARB, which, in light of the material, felt compelled to investigate.
Rather than have the staff act, the board appointed a four-man
panel.2 50 One reason for this special body was probably that an in-
vestigation of one of the oldest and most prestigious air pollution con-
trol districts in the country might prove difficult for the staff, some
of whom had learned the trade working there. Another was undoubt-
edly the sensitivity of the investigation. -51  The panel reduced the is-
sues raised to twenty-two, -id reported on each one. Generally the
group found the district to be performing satisfactorily, but criticized
it for relying too much on the penal sanctions for enforcement, and
for not following the law requiring the release of information to the
public. The panel's report did not limit itself to the questions
raised; 25 2 it reproached the district for generally failing to inform the
public accurately and effectively about air pollution, its causes and
controls. The APCD's deficiencies in this area probably cannot be
pursued by the ARB in the courts, and the panel recognized this:
nonetheless, the panel felt that there was good cause for the petition-
ers to be upset and that the reasons should be brought into focus.
25 3
Other Actors
The attorney general in California holds a distinct constitutional
office and as such operates independently of the governor and admin-
istrative agencies like the ARB. In recognition of this separation, cer-
tain powers of enforcement have been given the attorney general,
which he may utilize without formal regard to the actions of the ARB
or of the APCDs. The Health and Safety Code states:
250. The Chairman was the Vice-Chairman of the Air Resources Board, Gerald
Shearin. The technical experts were the Chairman of the Technical Advisory Commit-
tee of the 14-member board, R. Robert Brattain, and Dr. John Heslep, who was the
Department of Public Health's representative on the board at that time. William Sim-
mons, one of the authors of this article, was the fourth panel member.
251. Maga Interview, supra note 62.
252. Among the more important questions were: (1) Is the LAAPCD correctly
assessing the contribution of statutory sources to the overall air quality program? (2)
Are emissions limits reasonably related to achieving air quality standards? (3) Is the
hearing board carrying out its obligations? (4) Are the permit and inspection pro-
grams attaining compliance?
253. See FINAL REPORT, supra note 175.
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No provision of [Mulford-Carrell Act, Division 26], or of any or-
der, rule, or regulation of authority, is a limitation on:
(b) The power of the Attorney General, at the request of a local
or regional authority, the State Air Resources Board, or upon his
own motion, to bring an action in the name of the people of the
State of California to enjoin any pollution of nuisance.
254
Additionally, the civil penalties noted previously255 may be recovered
in a suit brought in the name of the People by, inter alia, the attor-
ney general.256  Finally, in addition to any common law powers, the
attorney general may, by statutory authority, bring actions to protect
the environment.257
As noted above,2 58 cities and counties are not foreclosed from
adopting more stringent standards than the state or district, and en-
forcement power is concurrent with the authority to adopt.
259
There is nothing in the air pollution law authorizing a lesser pol-
itical unit to enforce APCD's regulations or state law. However, a
district attorney, or a city attorney vested with misdemeanor enforce-
ment powers, could at least enforce the misdemeanor provisions of
such laws.
260
The Air Pollution Control Subvention Program
There is another important mode of interaction between the ARB
and the APCDs. In 1972 the Legislature added a program whereby
money is to be subvened to air pollution control districts each year. 61
The subvention is to be on -a one-for-one 62 basis for: (a) every
county or regional district whose boundaries include an entire air ba-
sin; (b) every unified district whose boundaries include an entire air
254. CAL. HEALTH & S. CODE § 39054.1 (West 1973) (emphasis added).
255. See text accompanying notes 186-90 supra.
256. CAL. HEALTH & S. CODE § 39262 (West 1973). Arguably this section only
applies when the attorney general serves as counsel for a district or for the ARB,
since the section on the disposition of penalties collected seems to assume that either
a district or the ARB will be a party. Id. § 24262 (West 1967).
257. CAL. Gov'T CODE §§ 12600-12 (West Supp. 1974).
258. See text accompanying note 105 supra.
259. CAL. HEALTH & S. CODE §§ 24247, 24360.3, 39057, 39462 (West 1967 &
1973).
260. See text accompanying notes 191-97 infra. This is so because generally the
prosecutor of a governmental unit is vested with power to enforce all criminal laws
of the state. E.g., CAL. Gov'T CODE § 26500 (West 1968).
261. CAL. HEALTH & S. CODE §§ 39280-91 (West 1973), added by Cal. Stat. 1972,
ch. 1016, § 1, at 1885.
262. One dollar for every dollar budgeted by the APCD from local sources. CAL.
HEALTH & S. CODE § 39282 (West 1973).
basin; or (c) county districts (including unified districts) whose bound-
aries include an entire air basin and who are parties to a joint power
or similar enforceable agreement which provides for uniform rules and
regulations among all districts, at least four meetings per year of the
Basinwide Air Pollution Control Coordinating Council,2" 3 and suitable
sharing of qualified air pollution personnel and equipment.2 64  Alloca-
tion is to be on a two-for-three26 5 basis in all other districts.266 In
both cases, however, the amount of the subvention is limited by pop-
ulation. ,7
The allowance may be reduced by the amount of any funds re-
ceived by a district from the federal government, but this need not oc-
cur if certain conditions exist, such as a critical air pollution problem. 26
The ARB may make additional subvention from any funds not allocated
at the end of any year.
269
The reason for the difference in ratios should be obvious: the
board and the legislature hoped it would lead to regional approaches
to air pollution control, and might even result in basinwide unified
APCDs 70  This money may not be manna for the districts, however,
since it comes with the proverbial strings: unless the districts con-
cerned "are actively and effectively engaged in the reduction of air
contaminants" in line with ARB-approved county programs and co-
ordinated basinwide plans, the funds will not be forthcoming. 17 1 When,
263. Formed pursuant to Health and Safety Code section 39272.
264. CAL. HEALTH & S. CODE § 39282 (West 1973).
265. Two dollars for every three dollars budgeted by the APCD from local
sources.
266. CAL. HEALTH & S. CODE § 39282 (West 1973).
267. If the ratio is 1:1, the limit is 23 cents per capita; if the ratio is 2:3, the
limit is 18.4 cents per capita. Id. §H 39282, 39283. In air basins of less than 98,000
population, the subvention may exceed the dollar and population limits if the counties
in the air basin qualify for a 1:1 subvention, but these special allowances may not ex-
ceed $45,000. Id. § 39284. The ARB believed no effective program could be operated
on less than $45,000, and the dollars-per capita limits would not permit payment of
anywhere near one-half that sum in those basins. Two very rural air basins (North-
east Plateau, in northeastern California, and the Great Basin Valleys, east of the Sierra
Nevada) qualify for the special subvention. Interview with George 1. Taylor, ARB
Deputy Executive Officer, in Sacramento, California, May 24, 1974 [hereinafter cited
as Taylor Interview].
268. CAL. HEALTH & S. CODE § 39287 (West 1973).
269. Id. § 39289.
270. This has occurred in the North Central Coast Air Basin (Monterey, Santa
Cruz, and San Benito counties), and is being actively considered in the North Coast
Air Basin. In both cases, a unified APCD is the approach followed. Several basins
obtain a 1:1 subvention through the contractual approach.
271. Id. § 39286 (emphasis added).
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through ARB proceedings2 72 or pursuant to a resolution of a district's
board of directors, the ARB concludes that this condition is not being
satisfied, the moneys that such district would have received "plus such
additional sum as may be necessary . . . shall be allocated to the
[ARB] itself to carry out the approved plan or program. 273  This sec-
tion dovetails quite nicely with the direct enforcement procedures dis-
cussed earlier, so that if the board finds it necessary to undertake en-
forcement activities it can use subvention funds to pay for them.
2 7 4
Moreover, if the ARB finds that the moneys budgeted by
an APCD in order to obtain the subvention are not being expended
in conformity with that plan, the ARB may cease further payments,
withhold future subventions, bring an action to recover moneys already
subvened, or assume the powers of the district summarily.2 7 5
It might be interesting at this point to analyze the conceptual
threads running through this scheme. Clearly a primary interest is
to provide an infusion of funds into the various districts. There is
apparently a direct correlation between the amount of money ex-
pended and the effectiveness of a program, and districts have long
contended that one of the major inpediments to effective enforcement
on the county level is this lack of funds. At the same time, however,
the subvention program is designed to encourage the formation of con-
trol strategies along regional lines, so it would appear that the aim
of the bill is not merely to provide money to counties-a position
which indirectly attacks the efficacy of those districts. The rebuttal
to this contention is that rather than striking at local districts, the sub-
vention program respects the options of county districts: instead of
simply imposing a regional district upon certain counties, it encour-
ages a regional strategy by whatever means appear most acceptable
in the particular air basin.
Open Burning
One final area of nonvehicular pollution must be studied. In
1970 the legislature added chapter. 10 to the Mulford-Carrell Act27 6
to provide for a uniform statewide policy regarding the control of open
burning for the disposal of combustible wastes. With certain excep-
272. Pursuant to Health and Safety Code section 39054, 39274, or 39275.
273. CAL. HEALTH & S. CODE § 39288 (West 1973).
274. Note that if the APCD board asks for intervention, the ARB need not follow
the procedure outlined in section 39054. Id. § 39286.
275. Id. § 39288.
276. Id. H§ 39295-99.4 (West 1973), added by Cal. Stat. 1970, ch. 1579, § 2, at
3291.
tions, such burning was prohibited after December 31, 197 1.277 This
means that open burning of "petroleum wastes, demolition debris,
tires, tar, trees, wood waste, or other combustible or flammable solid
or liquid waste" 278 is illegal. The air pollution control district is re-
sponsible for the primary administration of open burning laws, just as
it is for general industrial sources of pollution.279
The most important exception to the general ban is agricultural
burning, which is discussed below. Other exclusions involve: (1)
fires permitted by any public officer to abate a fire hazard, or to in-
struct persons in fire fighting methods;28  (2) backfires ;281 (3) fires
on the premises of single- or two-family dwellings; 282 (4) fires for
right-of-way clearing by a public utility, as long as the material has
been stacked and dried or otherwise prepared for better combustion
to the satisfaction of the air pollution control officer;28 3 (5) fires for
levee, ditch, or reservoir maintenance, subject to the same combustion
provisions as class (4);284 (6) fires at solid waste dumps owned or
operated by cities or counties, for a limited time only, upon permit
from the ARB issued under special circumstances described in the
statute;285 and (1) fires for the combustion of certain wood wastes
on property being developed for residential or commercial purposes. 86
The most extensive exemption from the ban is for agricultural
burning.28 7 In order not unduly to disrupt the agricultural industry,8 '
277. CAL. HEALTH & S. CODE § 39296 (West 1973).
278. Id.
279. Id. §§ 39298.8, 39299.2.
280. Id. § 39297.
281. Id. (when "necessary to save life or valuable property").
282. Id. § 39297.2 (except for "disposal of combustible or flammable solid waste").
283. Id. § 39297.3.
284. Id.
285. Id. § 39297.4. These circumstances include sparce population and "economic
and technical difficulties." Id. The ARB initially granted time extensions ranging
from two months to two years for about 300 city and county dumps, and some further
extensions are being given. An extension is granted only when there is a showing that
there are problems in changing to sanitary landfills or other refuse disposal plans.
286. Id. § 39297.6 (waste from "trees, vines, or bushes"). This amendment was
designed to permit selective burning of materials from cleared subdivisions so that sani-
tary landfills in certain areas would not be overburdened. Before such burning can
occur (1) the APCD board must find that it is more desirable to burn rather than
to use other means of disposal; (2) the district must have developed criteria for such
burning to improve the combustibility of material; (3) the ARB must approve these
standards; and (4) the air pollution control officer must issue a permit for the burning.
The section automatically expires as of July 1, 1977.
287. Id. § 39297.1. The variance provisions, discussed in text accompanying
notes 198-217 supra, do not apply to the open burning sections of chapter 10.
288. Id. §§ 39298.4, 39299.3.
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the legislature provided for the regulation of argicultural burning so
that such burnings will be prohibited on days when dispersion and dif-
fusion of smoke will be low.
28 9
Administration of the agricultural burning provisions essentially
is accomplished on three levels. The ARB determines from meteoro-
logical conditions upon what days such burning is to be permitted.290
The ARB is also responsible for the promulgation of guidelines for
the regulation and control of agricultural burning in each air basin. "91
To implement these standards local authorities are to adopt (and have
adopted) plans which must include both emission criteria and enforce-
ment procedures.292  The ARB is required to review the plans, and
if it finds that a scheme is "reasonably calculated to achieve air quality
standards applicable to the basin" it must approve the plan.293  If it
does not so find, however, or if no timely program is submitted, then
the board, after public hearing, ". . . shall have all the powers of any
local and regional authority within the basin to adopt an alternative
plan for the local or regional authority.
294
Although the APCD is responsible generally for the enforcement
of regulations relating to agricultural burning, fire protection agencies
perform much of the day-to-day administrative functions, because they
are appointed by the ARB to administer the specialized permit sys-
tem.295  This bifurcation of "front-line" authority over agricultural
burning has essentially worked well, but some friction has developed
where fire officials feel they have been injected into a program which
has nothing to do with fire suppression and which has created adminis-
trative headaches.290 Generally, the APCD alone enforces the no-
bum-day ban when it is violated.297
Two interesting legal questions related to the control of agricul-
tural burning have arisen. The first is substantive: how broad is the
definition of "agricultural burning"? The second is jurisdictional: may
an APCD impose more stringent regulations upon agricultural burn-
ing, as it may with other nonvehicular sources? For example, can an
289. See id. § 39298.
290. Id. Under contract with the ARB, the Los Angeles APCD and the
BAAPCD do the forecasting for their respective air basins.
291. Id. § 39298.2.
292. Id. § 39298.8. Emission limits are not practical for agricultural burning and
have not been adopted. Wong-Woo Interview, supra note 42.
293. CAL. HEALTH & S. CODE § 39298.9 (West 1973).
294. Id.
295. Id. § 39298.1.
296. Wong-Woo Interview, supra note 42.
297. Id.
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APCD ban the burning of one crop as long as it does not ban all types
of agricultural burning?
The ARB staff thought that the statutory definition of agricultural
burning29 s excluded material not grown on the property. However,
some counties insisted on including within such burning items like
paper pesticide sacks, wood pallets, paper used to wrap palm dates
hanging on trees, and raisin trays used in the fields to dry grapes.
299
The ARB finally resolved the issue at a public hearing, by specifically
including "material . . . intimately related to the growing or harvest-
ing of crops and which are used in the field . . ."I" and by listing
certain examples, such as "trays for drying raisins, date palm protec-
tion paper, and fertilizer or pesticide sacks or containers" '' where
such items are emptied in the fields.
The second question may be more important, for various citizens'
groups would like to eliminate the burning of certain crops al-
together.30 2 These organizations contend that the smoke from such
burning is a great detriment to the general public, while the burning
itself benefits only a few people; moreover, alternatives to combustion
are available in some instances. 3
Section 39057 of the Health and Safety Code asserts that 'no
local or regional authority may completely ban all agricultural burn-
ing";30 4 in contrast, section 39299.3 of that code states that "[ilt is
the intent of the Legislature, by the enactment of this article, that agri-
cultural burning be reasonably regulated, and not be prohibited by
the board. ' ' °3n The attorney general has rendered an informal opinion
which concludes that no air pollution control district may ban any type
of agricultural burning;30 6 clearly, however, it is also possible to reach
298. CAL. HEALTH & S. CODE § 39295.6 (West 1973); CAL. ADM. CODE tit. 17,
§ 80100(b).
299. The staff was not too concerned with these types of burning per se, but was
worried that if a broader definition were used, to permit this sort of burning, other,
needless kinds of burning would result. Wong-Woo Interview, supra note 42.
300. CAL. ADM. CODE tit. 17, § 80100(b).
301. Id.
302. In Yolo County, for example, a Sierra Club group has undertaken a study
of the agricultural burning situation, with an eye to the elimination of at least some
forms of such burning.
303. Morgester Interview, supra note 219; Interview with Sydney Thornton, ARB
Assistant Air Pollution Operations Specialist (plant pathologist), in Sacramento, Cal-
ifornia, May 24, 1974. Common alternatives are plowing or discing under. The diffi-
cult issue is the determination of when the alternatives are economically feasible. Id.
304. CAL. HEALTH & S. CODE § 39057 (West 1973) (emphasis added).
305. Id. § 39299.3 (emphasis added).
306. Letter from Evelle J. Younger, California Attorney General, to John A.
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another result, e.g., that some of the many types of agricultural burn-
ing may be banned, as long as all such burning is not completely pro-
hibited. Therein, of course, lies the problem, one upon which the two
authors of this article are in fact in disaccord.30 7  The difficult ques-
tions posed by either position perhaps indicate that further legislative
pronouncement on the matter would be the most appropriate solution.
Jurisdictional Problem Areas
While there appears to be a distinct delineation between and
among entities charged with air pollution control, there remain areas
of concern for which no nice separation of powers has been made.
In this section we will discuss two examples of jurisdictional overlay
and conflict.
The Air Pollution Control Framework versus
Other Governmental Agencies
Emissions from fossil-fueled powerplants have long been trouble-
some. In Orange County, for example, it was estimated that some
63 percent of the oxides of nitrogen 05 from nonvehicular sources was
attributable to generating plants of Southern California Edison.30 9
Statistics tend to indicate that coal-burning powerplants are the source
of even more hazardous pollutants.310 However, there is also an abun-
dance of evidence that this country is experiencing the initial stages
of a long-term energy shortage. Thus, it seems that there has been,
and likely will be, conflict between those agencies charged with en-
vironmental regulation of energy-producing facilities, and those agen-
cies with responsibility for developing energy resources.
In 1969, for example, the Southern California Edison Company
Maga, ARB Executive Officer, December 23, 1971 (Attorney General No. S.O. 71/43
IL).
307. These include, in support of the attorney general's position, the unanswered
dilemma as to the extent of prohibition permitted if "some but not all" crop burning
can be banned, and the general matter of legislative intent: the ARB staff member
who worked on the burning bills in the legislature in 1970 believes that that body in-
tended to prevent the ARB and the APCDs from banning any burning of agricultural
waste. Interview with George J. Taylor, ARB Deputy Executive Officer, in Sacra-
mento, California, May 24, 1974.
308. Oxides of nitrogen react in the sunlight with hydrocarbons to produce photo-
chemical oxidant, which is commonly called smog.
309. Orange County APCD v. PUC, 4 Cal. 3d 945, 953, 484 P.2d 1361, 1366,
95 Cal. Rptr. 17, 22 (1971).
310. Tarlock, Tippy & Francis, Environmental Regulation of Power Plant Siting:
Existing and Proposed Institutions, 45 S. CAL. L. REV. 502, 510 (1972) [hereinafter
cited as Environmental Regulation].
(hereinafter Edison) sought to add two new fossil-fueled generating
units to its existing installation at Huntington Beach. It applied to the
Public Utilities Commission (PUC) for a certificate of public conveni-
ence and necessity,31' and to the Orange County Air Pollution Control
District (OCAPCD) for a permit to construct. 312  The air pollution
control officer refused Edison's application on the grounds that the in-
formation did not adequately show that the plant, when operated,
would comply with statutory nuisance provisions of the Health and
Safety Code,311 and that the proposed addition would meet certain
emission standards adopted by the OCAPCD after Edison's first ap-
plication. 314  A subsequent appeal by the company to the hearing
board of the OCAPCD resulted in affirmation of the permit denial,
and Edison did not seek judicial review. 15 Very shortly thereafter,
however, the PUC issued a certificate to Edison which directed the
utility to begin construction immediately. The PUC claimed that it
had exclusive jurisdiction over matters of powerplant siting.
The OCAPCD sued to block construction, and the case eventually
wound up in the California Supreme Court. That tribunal decided
that air pollution control districts exercise coequal jurisdiction with
other state agencies, and that the OCAPCD could therefore require
Edison to obtain a permit, notwithstanding the certificate from the
PU'C. In reaching this conclusion the court looked to provisions of
the enabling act which permit the APCD to enforce its rules and reg-
ulations against state or local governmental agencies.316 These, it rea-
soned, while not dispositive, are strong indications that the power of
an APCD is not limited to that of a mere local body. Moreover, the
court found that an APCD is clearly not merely a subdivision of county
government, but a separate and distinct political entity.317  Because
(1) the power of the OCAPCD vis-a-vis state agencies is greater than
that of a county, (2) the nature of the entity itself is separate from
that of the county, and (3) the legislature itself had enacted the com-
prehensive scheme for the regulation of air pollution rather than sim-
311. CAL. CONST. art. XII, §§ 22, 23. Such a certificate is issued pursuant to
CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 1001 (West Supp. 1974).
312. See note 178 supra for the Los Angeles APCD's permit rule.
313. 4 Cal. 3d at 949, 484 P.2d at 1363, 95 Cal. Rptr. at 19.
314. Rule 67 of the OCAPCD as it then existed.
315. 4 Cal. 3d at 950, 484 P.2d at 1364, 95 Cal. Rptr. at 20. Note that judicial
review is permitted pursuant to sections 24322 and 24323. Some commentators think
that this failure was a significant factor in subsequent litigation. See Environmental
Regulation, supra note 310, at 543.
316. 4 Cal. 3d at 952, 484 P.2d at 1365-66, 95 Cal. Rptr. at 21-22.
317. Id. at 952-53, 484 P.2d at 1366, 95 Cal. Rptr. at 22.
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ply delegating that authority to the county, the supreme court con-
cluded that the PUC and the APCD must share concurrent jurisdiction
over generating plants.
The court never specifically characterized the nature of the
APCD-it simply noted that it has attributes both of a state agency
and of a local entity. Thus, the ACDP remains an anomaly, having
neither the status of a special district,318 nor that of a county or city,
nor that of a true state agency.319 Clearly, however, the APCD may
exercise jurisdiction concurrently with any other state agencies in the
absence of statutory language limiting such authority.
The Warren-Alquist State Energy Resources Conservation and
Development Acts2" has the effect of negating Orange County v. PUC.
The act pre-empts the regulatory jurisdiction of the air pollution control
agencies and all other local and state agencies formerly having juris-
diction over power plants.32" ' The apparent purpose of this change is
to give the utilities a one-stop permit system, and at the same time to
subject them to state-imposed siting requirements of the new act.3 2
All is not lost, however, because the new State Energy Resources
Conservation and Development Commission, in issuing a permit for
a powerplant, must assure itself that the plant complies with all state,
local and regional laws and standards. Such a finding is unnecessary,
however, if the commission determines that such facility is required
for public convenience and necessity and that there are not more
prudent and feasible means of achieving such purposes. In addition
the commission shall in no event make any finding in conflict with
applicable federal laws or regulations.3 23  The restriction of federal
prescripts is the ultimate restraint, because APCD rules and regula-
tions are approved and incorporated into EPA regulations and there-
fore have the same effect as federal law.324  Thus, while the APCDs
have lost jurisdiction, their EPA-approved rules must still be met. No
control has been lost, except possibly in enforcement, 25 and stream-
318. See CAL. GoV'T CODE §§ 56039, 56040 (West 1966) (definition of special
district).
319. See generally id. §§ 11000-49 (West 1966 & Supp. 1974) (governing state
agencies); id. §§ 11150-202 (governing state departments).
320. Cal. Stat. 1974, ch. 276.
321. CAL. PuB. Ris. CODE § 2550 (West 1970).
322. See id. §§ 25004, 25006, 25500.
323. Id. § 25525.
324. 40 C.F.R. §§ 52.02(d), 52.223 (1973).
325. See CAL. PuB. RE& CODE §§ 25506, 25538 (West 1970). The APCDs must
be consulted as to the emission capabilities of a facility, but nothing gives them any
authority to enforce. Hopefully, the commission will seek the assistance of the experts
in the APCDs to assure compliance.
lined procedures have been gained for the siting and approval of pow-
erplants.
Problems within the Infrastructure: ARB versus APCD
Many, if not most, of the separate functions of the ARB and
the various APCDs are carefully set forth in the enabling acts, as noted
previously. There are still some areas of regulation open to specula-
tion, however, and the following case study illustrates one aspect of
the problem of division of authority.
It is the belief of the Environmental Protection Agency that lead
in the atmosphere can have a seriously deleterious effect on human be-
ings.32 6 The Air Resources Board agrees, and has an ambient air
quality standard for lead327 (the EPA does not). Leaded gasoline
is one of the major sources of lead particulates in the atmosphere, but
it only becomes a real problem when the fuel is burned, such as in
the internal-combustion engine of a motor vehicle. 2 8 In California,
though, there is still dispute over which agency has jurisdiction to pre-
scribe the lead content in gasoline: the APCD, the ARB, or
neither?329
Recent litigation has emphasized the problem. In one case, the
Environmental Defense Fund petitioned the ARB to promulgate ve-
hicular emissions standards for lead particulates and thereby indirectly
326. 38 Fed. Reg. 1258 (1973).
327. CAL. ADM. CODE tit. 17, § 70200.
328. 38 Fed. Reg. 1258 (1973).
329. It is important to note that the EPA has established standards for lead con-
tent in motor vehicle fuel-primarily because catalytic converters to be used as emis-
sion control devices on 1975 and later model-year vehicles are damaged by lead. Id.
at 1253. EPA is still considering health-related lead regulations. Id. at 1257. Note,
too, that federal action does not foreclose California from establishing additional,
stricter regulations. See Clean Air Act § 211(c)(4)(B), 42 U.S.C. 1857f-6c(c)(4)
(B) (1970). Frank Bonamassa, Supervising Engineer for the ARB, indicated the rea-
son why the lead issue is still alive, despite the federal rules in testimony at an EPA
hearing on proposed federal lead regulations held in Los Angeles, May 2, 1972: "Sixty
to sixty-five percent reduction of lead from motor fuels is not good enough in Califor-
nia."
A related problem has recently become the subject of litigation in San Diego: reg-
ulation of the recovery and disposal of gasoline vapors emitted throughout the gasoline
marketing process. Atlantic Richfield Co. v. APCD of San Diego County, No. 356319
(Super. Ct., San Diego County, filed July 29, 1974). The San Diego APCD has estab-
lished regulations requiring marketers of gasoline to obtain permits for approved vapor
collection and disposal systems. ARCO, seeking an alternative writ of mandate, has al-
leged inter alia that the APCD is without jurisdiction to issue rules concerning such va-
por emissions, implying that only the ARB or the Legislature has such power. Tele-
phone Interview with Foster Knight, Deputy Attorney General, San Diego County, Au-
gust 24, 1974.
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to control lead discharge .3 °  The ARB refused, on the advice of the
attorney general, who opined that the board was without statutory au-
thorization to regulate such emissions. The Environmental Defense
Fund then sought a declaratory judgment to the effect that the ARB
did, in fact, possess such power; defendants' motion for summary judg-
ment was granted, and the Court of Appeal, First Appellate District,
affirmed331 (certiorari was denied). In another action the Western
Oil and Gas Association sought to restrain enforcement of Rule 74
of the Orange County APCD which regulates the lead content of gaso-
line. The superior court granted the request on the grounds that only
the ARB has authority to regulate lead content in motor vehicle
fuels.
332
The court of appeal in the first case above found that while the
ARB had authority to promulgate emissions standards for specified
pollutants,33 and although it was given certain special powers relating
to fuels, there was no specific grant of authority to regulate the content
of motor vehicle fuel. Stated simply, the tribunal held that the au-
thority to regulate what comes out of the car does not implicitly author-
ize ARB to indirectly control those emissions by prescribing what goes
into the vehicle. 34
There seem to be four possible answers to this apparent conflict:
(a) the ARB alone has the power; (b) the APCD alone has the
power; (c) they enjoy concurrent jurisdiction; or (d) neither has the
power.
The attorney general, the only party common to both suits, has
taken the position (along with Orange County APCD) that only
330. Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. California Air Resources Bd., 30 Cal.
App. 3d 829, 106 Cal. Rptr. 598 (1973).
331. Id.
332. Western Oil & Gas Ass'n v. Orange County APCD, No. 191239 (Super. Ct.,
Orange County, April 21, 1972). This case has become mired in a procedural morass;
moreover, a petition to the California Supreme Court to consolidate it with the Envi-
ronmental Defense Fund ease for a ruling on the merits was rejected. Letter from
G.E. Bishel, Clerk of the Supreme Court, to Roderick Walston, Deputy Attorney Gen-
eral, Thomas J. Graff, & J. William Wigert, October 11, 1972. Trial was finally con-
ducted in the Orange County Superior Court on July 12, 1973; the court held that the
APCD lacked authority, relying on state preeemption under section 39102 of the
Health and Safety Code, and on the notion that fuel regulation is not a proper subject
for county-by-county regulation. Telephone Interview with John Powell, Deputy
County Counsel, Orange County, May 31, 1974. The Court of Appeal affirmed the
judgment on July 10, 1974, and a petition for a hearing in the supreme court has been
filed.
333. 30 Cal. App. 3d at 833-34, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 600-01.
334. Id. at 836, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 602-03.
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APCD's can regulate lead content of gasoline. The Court of Appeal,
First Appellate District, agreed that the ARB does not have the power,
but the Environmental Defense Fund decision is not dispositive of
whether the APCD's do have such authority.335 An analysis of those
arguments hopefully will add some dimension to an understanding of
the ARB and the APCDs.
The attorney general and the Orange County APCD essentially
contend that the APCDs were originally endowed with broad general
jurisdiction over all forms of air pollution.336 The authority for lead
regulation may be found in the general rulemaking powers given
APCDs, as well as in the emergency powers of such districts. 37 Only
that authority expressly given the ARB by the Mulford-Carrell Act was
removed from the APCDs, and regulation of lead was not included
therein.338  Moreover, it is asserted that no such power may be fairly
implied, for several reasons:
1. The ARB has certain limited authority over fuel content, in-
dicating that if the legislature had meant to extend that power it coula
specifically have done So.3
39
2. As evidenced by federal statutes there is a clear distinction
between the emission standards and the setting of fuel content stand-
ards. Had the latter been intended in California, it would have been
expressed as in the federal law. 40
3. The legislature's consistent refusal to enact laws empowering
the ARB to regulate lead indicates its intent that the ARB not have
such power.34'
335. There was dicta in the original, unprinted decision to the effect that the
APCD did not possess the power to regulate lead either, but on motion of the attorney
general (who argued that this point was superfluous and had therefore not been briefed
by either side) that dicta was excised. Id. at 837, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 603.
336. See Brief for California Attorney General & Air Resources Board as Amici
Curiae at 8-14, Orange County Air Pollution Control Bd. v. Superior Court, 4 Civil
No. 12228 (Cal. Ct. App., 1st Dist., filed Sept. 7, 1972) [hereinafter cited as ARB
Brief].
337. Id. at 8 (citing Health and Safety Code sections 24260, 24262 and 24263.7).
338. Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Demurrer and Motion
for Summary Judgment, Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. California Air Resources
Bd., 30 Cal. App. 3d 829, 106 Cal. Rptr. 598 (1973) [hereinafter cited as A.G. Mem-
orandum]. The attorney general contends that the ARB is charged with responsibility
to set ambient air quality standards, and to regulate emission from motor vehicles, but
that these powers do not give it authority to require emission control devices for regu-
lation of lead (since none are technologically feasible) nor to control lead emissions
indirectly through regulation of fuel content.
339. Id. at 4-5.
340. Id. at 9. See 30 Cal. App. 3d at 835, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 601-02.
341. A.G. Memorandum, supra note 338, at 7. See A.B. 399 (1971); A.B. 1104
(1972).
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4. Power to regulate lead would be an impermissible enlarge-
ment or alteration of the enabling act.
342
5. The ARB could not indirectly control lead by promulgating
an emission standard therefor, since such an indirect regulation of lead
content in fuel is technologically unfeasible. 43
Some of these arguments are persuasive and indeed were made
by the Environmental Defense Fund court. However, there are possi-
ble criticisms of this perception of the nature of each of the agencies
in question.
There are at least two potential problems with the assertion that
APCDs have broad authority over all sources and that the ARB ac-
quired only limited powers in 1967. First, there is no specific author-
ization for APCDs to regulate lead; hence, unless such authority is
to be inferred from the very general powers given the APCDs, then
it does not exist therein. Further, if it can be so implied, there are
more persuasive reasons for inferring the power from the ARB's gen-
eral authority, to be discussed shortly. Second, there is no reason
given for the assertion that the Mulford-Carrell Act should be con-
strued narrowly; the better rule of statutory construction would seem
to augur for an interpretation giving full effect to the provisions of
each act and harmonizing where possible.3f" Moreover, the policy
declarations contained in that act appear to give the ARB very broad
power to control vehicular emissions,345 to establish other standards,
and to coordinate34 and supervise 347 air conservation activities within
the state. It is therefore difficult to see why the APCD alone should
be given lead regulation authority.
The statutory division of powers seems to be along vehicular ver-
sus nonvehicular lines;348 thus, the problem would seem to be char-
acterization of the source. Once the general classification of a source
is made, it can be argued that a presumption of regulatory jurisdic-
tion adheres to the agency generally charged with responsibility, and
the issue becomes whether the agency has real authority to act upon
this general responsibility.
According to the definitions in the act, "vehicular" sources refers
342. A.G. Memorandum, supra note 338, at 10.
343. Id. at 11-12.
344. See generally 82 C.J.S. Statutes §§ 311, 362 (1953); Friends of Mammoth v.
Board of Supervisors, 8 Cal. 3d 247, 502 P.2d 1049, 104 Cal. Rptr. 761 (1972).
345. See CAL. HEALTH & S. CODE § 39012 (West 1973).
346. See id. § 39013.
347. Id. §§ 39052(f), 39054, 39274-75.
348. See id. § 39012.
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to those "emitted from motor vehicles" 346 while nonvehicular sources
are everything else.350 Unless regulation of lead is related to motor
vehicle emissions, then, the ARB would seem to be out of luck; but,
of course, lead from gasoline only becomes an air pollution problem
after it is burned and emitted from the tailpipe of a motor vehicle.
While this seems persuasive, the attorney general asserts that there
are differences between emissions control and fuel composition con-
trol; and the First District Court of Appeal agreed. 351 The attorney
general contends that the fuel, when composition is actually regulated,
is not vehicular in any sense and therefore falls within the province
of the APCD; but this may be a rather artificial position, since lead
is only emitted into the air after combustion. Moreover, one could
certainly argue that the regulation of lead content is an indirect regula-
tion of emission, or, alternately, that a restriction that could only be com-
plied with by use of unleaded fuel is nonetheless clearly an emissions
regulation. It seems, therefore, that leaded gasoline is probably a ve-
hicular source.
The issue then becomes whether the ARB has authority to act
upon its general jurisdiction in the area, and if so, whether the grant
of jurisdictional authority to the ARB forecloses the APCD even if
there is some statutory authorization for the APCD to act. First, it
might be argued that indirect regulation of fuel content (by an emis-
sion standard that could be met only by altering fuel composition) is
permissible.352 The strongest proposition advanced by the attorney
general against this contention is that removal of lead from gasoline
is technologically unfeasible,353 but he stated just the reverse in the
Western Oil & Gas case.354
Second, it may be asserted that the power to regulate lead in gas-
oline can be inferred from the ARB's responsibilities to set and meet
ambient air quality standards3 55 and to set emissions standards for pol-
lutants. 56 There is substantial judicial support for the propsition that
349. Id. § 39007.
350. Id. § 39008.
351. Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. California Air Resources Bd., 30 Cal.
App. 3d 829, 835-36, 106 Cal. Rptr. 598, 601-02.
352. The attorney general asserted that emission requirements can only be met
through "devices" of some sort (A.G. Memorandum, supra note 338, at 12), but there
is no statutory language so limiting the standards, and "device" is defined very broadly
to apply to engine modifications. CAL. HEALTH & S. CODE § 39093 (West 1973).
353. A.G. Memorandum, supra note 338, at 13.
354. ARB Brief, supra note 336, at 17.
355. CAL. HEALTH & S. CODE § 39052(f), (m) (West 1973).
356. Id. § 39052(m).
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powers necessarily ancillary to specifically delegated authority may be
implied.357  In one recent Supreme Court case, for example, the Fed-
eral Communications Commission was permitted to regulate cable TV
even though (a) it was not even invented at the time of enactment
of the enabling legislation, (b) it was not one of the enumerated pow-
ers of the agency, and (c) the commission itself denied its author-
ity for several years, and even sought special enabling legislation from
Congress (which was not enacted).3 5s
Although this latter decision is federal authority, the reasoning
sems persuasive. 359 A similar situation obtains in California insofar
as the state is unable to achieve its ambient air quality standard with-
out some means of regulation of lead in gasoline. It is empowered
to control motor vehicle emissions which include lead. To avoid frus-
tration of the significant state interest involved, the power to regulate
lead content directly or indirectly should be implied. The dilemma
arises from cases holding that alteration or enlargement of statutory
authority is unlawful;3 60 however, on the basis of decisions like South-
western Cable, and because the authority to regulate emissions exists
within the statute, without regard to whether such limitation is direct
or indirect, those cases are arguably inapplicable to the problem at
hand.
It should also be stressed that were the ARB to have adopted
this construction of the statute, it would have been entitled to great
weight in subsequent court proceedings. Unfortunately, the board
took the opposite stance upon the advice of the attorney general,361
and that position became a self-fulfilling prophesy: the court of ap-
peal in the Environmental Defense Fund decision apparently found
357. See, e.g., United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157 (1968),
cited in K. DAVIs, ADMINISTR TIVE LAW TIrATISE §§ 2.00-.02 (Supp. 1970); cases
cited in 2 CAL. JuR. 3d, Administrative Law § 39 (1973).
358. United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157 (1968).
359. The Supreme Court said in that case, for example: "The Commission has
been charged with broad responsibilities for the orderly development of an appropriate
system of local television broadcasting .... The Commission has reasonably found
that the successful performance of these duties demands prompt and efficacious regula-
tion of community antenna television systems. We have elsewhere held that we may
not, 'in the absence of compelling evidence that such was Congress' intention ... pro-
hibit administrative action imperative for the achievement of an agency's ultimate pur-
poses.', 392 U.S. at 177. Note that FCC sponsorship of legislation which was de-
feated was not "compelling evidence" of intent; other cases hold negative implication
from failing legislation to be unpersuasive as well.
360. See note 357 supra.
361. Letter from Evelle J. Younger, California Attorney General, to Senator Nic-
olas C. Petris, March 8, 1971.
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that the ARB's interpretation was a significant factor against implying
the power, and accorded that construction "great weight. 3 0
These two cases illustrate ,the fundamental separation of function
between the ARB and the APCD: the vehicular-nonvehicular dichot-
omy. The dividing line between respective responsibilities is not al-
ways clear, but it should be noted that while the vehicular-nonvehi-
cular split is a basic division, it is not an exclusive separation: as dis-
cussed earlier, the ARB exercises supervisory jurisdiction over the
standards, administration, and enforcement of the APCDs.
Conclusion
As a preliminary matter, if our footnotes regarding the California
air pollution control statutes have been followed closely, it should be
apparent that there is a great need for reoganization, reduction and
simplification of these laws, particularly for elimination of inconsisten-
cies. Basically, there is no necessity now for three sets of substantive
rules on nonvehicular pollution (county, BAAPCD and the unused re-
gional). The solution lies with Assembly Bill 2867,303 by Assembly-
man Richard D. Hayden, introduced at the request of the Air Resources
Board.
It may seem from our discussion that it takes an extraordinarily
complex bureaucracy to protect and enhance a resource which every-
one once seemed to take for granted: clean air. Economists once
spoke of air as the classic "free good"; hopefully, few still harbor this
tragically mistaken notion. Is the particular system for air quality
management which exists in California today really a good one? Is
it wastefully striated and diverse? Or does it balance the need for
local input into the allocation process with the need to maintain certain
statewide standards and policies for all citizens? While an intensive
comparative law study is beyond the scope of this article, we would
like to comment on the structure as we see it, and to suggest how
it might be improved.
Our central finding could be expressed as follows: air pollution
is a regional phenomenon; and, at least in areas where the problem
362. Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. California Air Resources Bd., 35 Cal.
App. 3d 829, 836, 106 Cal. Rptr. 598, 602 (1973). Even if plaintiffs' position were
approved by the courts, the ARB would still face Health and Safety Code section
39180.2, which, as to used vehicles, requires legislative approval of devices not specific-
ally authorized elsewhere in the code. Might not this restriction apply to fuel additives
as well?
363. 1973-74 Legislative session; this measure failed passage in 1974.
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of air contaminants is relatively serious, the benefits of "grass roots"
local control are outweighed by the need for regional regulation. Cou-
pled with this notion is our belief that a strong state regulatory agency
must exist to supervise the activities of local and regional agencies,
and to insure that certain standards of air quality are met throughout
the state.
As we have noted previously, air pollution is a physical phenome-
non which only respects political boundaries when they happen to co-
incide with the natural boundaries.364 Because of this, the thesis that
regulation should be by a governmental unit of smaller size than the
air basin-which, by definition, cannot exercise jurisdiction over all
sources of air pollution in that basin-is inherently suspect to
US.
Proponents of local air pollution control programs often advance
the proposition that local government is both more responsive to its
constituency and more sensitive to the types of problems associated
with the locality than are higher levels of administration.365  However,
a number of authors have noted that local management may be impotent
to deal with the problems of metropolitan areas.3 66  In the area of air
364. See CoMMrIEE REPORT, supra note 72, at 29, 32.
365. "In the township, as well as everywhere else, the people are the source of
power; but nowhere do they exercise their power more immediately. . . . Yet munici-
pal institutions constitute the strength of free nations. Town meetings are to liberty
what primary schools are to science; they bring it within the people's reach, they teach
men how to use and how to enjoy it. A nation may establish a free government, but
without municipal institutions it cannot have the spirit of liberty." A. DE TocQuE-
VILLE, 1 DEMOCRACY nN Aam cA 63-64 (1954), cited in G. BLAIR, AMERCAN LOCAL
GOVERNMENT 9 (1964). This author notes other philosophical and historical roots of
what has been called everything from "Jacksonian Democracy" to "Power to the Peo-
ple." See generally J. BOLLENS, J. BAYES, & K. UTTER, AMERiCAN Cou~N GOVERN-
MENT (1969), and works cited in the bibliography therein; H. TuNER, AMEUCAN DEm-
ocRAcY, STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT (1968); C. ADRIAN, STATE AND LOCAL GEv-
ERNMENTS (2d ed. 1967).
Supervisor Warren M. Dom of Los Angeles County has said, for example, 'Truly
air pollution knows no boundaries.... This suggestion should not be interpreted as
recommending a larger control agency [than the county united]. It may be that . ..
the program is being diluted by using an agency that is too distant from the problem."
Dor, Improving Existing Local or Regional Air Pollution Control Programs, U.S. PUB-
LIC HEALTH SERVIcE, Pun. No. 1649, PRocEEDINGs: THE Tnnm NATIONAL CONFERENCE
ON Am POLLUTION 410, 411 (1966). See also Lochner, The Case for a Local or Re-
gional Air Pollution Control Program, id. at 400, 402. This author also discusses re-
gional control as opposed to state or federal control.
366. See, e.g., G. BLAIR, AMERICAN LOCAL GovERNMENT, chs. 7 & 8 (1964); R.
WARREN, GovEPNMENT IN METROPOLITAN AREAS (1966) (especially Chapter 1). On
the general topic of metropolitan government, see J. BOLLENS & H. SCHMANDT, THE
METROPOLIS (2d ed. 1970); Leiken, Governmental Schemes for the Metropolis and the
Implementation of Metropolitan Change, 49 J. URBAN L. 667 (1972). The impotency
pollution control, for example, the very receptiveness which is sup-
posedly an asset for local government may oversensitize it to economic
issues, such as expanding the property tax base, or increasing the wage
of -the voter.' 67
Another related criticism of local control over air pollution pro-
grams is that local entities cannot generate enough funds to support
effective plans adequately; 368 the problems of local government fi-
nance in any number of matters are well-known. 69 Moreover, the
fiscal crisis in many areas has led to wide variation in programs of
all types, which diversity is not necessarily reflective of any real dif-
ference in the problems, but is often due only to disparities of
wealth.370
On a practical level, the theory of utilizing existing county gov-
ernment as a policy-making body eliminates much of the high cost of
setting up a distinct unit and avoids certain criticisms of "special dis-
tricts" as agencies of governmental control unreponsive to their constit-
uency (in derogation of the cardinal principle of local government).
However, it also demands too much time and expertise of the county
supervisor.
In any event, the fundamental problem is that air pollution emit-
ted in one place may affect another area downwind. This is the situa-
tion which obtains in the South Coast Air Basin, which is comprised
of six counties that have some differing standards. Yet the downwind
counties of San Bernardino and Riverside are affected by air pollution
generated in Los Angeles and Orange Counties. Unfortunately, the
former two have little input into the air quality decisions in the latter
becomes acute, and the legal problems monumental when it comes to air basins located
in more than one state. See Hassett, Enforcement Problems in the Air Quality Field:
Some Intergovernmental Structural Aspects, 4 ECOLOGY L.Q. 63 (1974).
367. "The intense competition between the states for industry militates against the
adoption of an effective air pollution control program. State and local governments
hesitate to embark upon a vigorous program to improve the quality of the air if the
program, by increasing the cost of plant operations, will not only force individual firms
to relocate in other states to gain a competitive advantage but will also discourage other
firms from locating in that state." Zimmerman, Political Boundaries and Air Pollution
Control, 46 J. URBAN L. 173, 175 (1969). While Zimmerman is referring specifically
to interstate problems in a relatively small geographic area on the Atlantic Seaboard
(id. at 173), the comment is equally germane to the large counties in California.
368. See, e.g., COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 72, at 29.
369. See R. WARREN, GOVERNMENT IN METROPOLITAN REGIONS 119-40 (1966); J.
BOLLENS & H. SCHMANDT, THE METROPOLIS chs. 8, 10 (2d ed. 1970).
370. One of the best examples of this general phenomena is the variation of school
district budgets, recently successfully attacked in Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 487
P.2d 1241, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601 (1971).
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except through the Basinwide Coordinating Council, which, as we
have noted, has virtually no power to enforce standards.
371
There are several ways to remedy the problems associated with
local government control. Robert Bish, for example, in his book The
Public Economy of Metropolitan Areas,3 72 recognizes the criticisms ad-
vanced earlier and notes three general solutions which may be appli-
cable to air pollution control.
The first is a system of direct grants to local government. 73 Such
an infusion of funds would enable those jurisdictions presently unable
to allocate resources to air quality management to establish a program,
thus minimizing the "spill over out" which occurs when sources in one
area are left uncontrolled. It would also tend to equalize programs
among the counties, and it could remove some of the pressure for ad-
ditional funds that a district might exert upon a county. As discussed
previously, California now has such a program in the Air Pollution
Control Subvention Fund. 74  Note, however, that this scheme in-
volves a great deal of state supervision; thus there is a certain loss
of local autonomy even in a financial program.
The second alternative involves contracts between jurisdictions . 75
In California this appraoch is represented by the joint-powers-agree-
ments possible between air pollution control districts, 876 and by the
unified air pollution control district.3 77  Through such compacts, some
of the decision-making powers of two or more counties are consoli-
dated, thereby partially resolving the problem of protecting downwind
areas. The accords would also mean that the districts could share re-
sources so that both (or all) would not have to spend as much for per-
sonnel and equipment. Of course, unless all of a particular air basin
were included within the agreement or unified district, many of these
difficulties would not be alleviated to the maximum extent possible;
371. Slowly there is developing an integrated effort in the South Coast Air Basin.
The coordinating council, under ARB and EPA pressure, has created a uniform emer-
gency episode regulation which may cause one county to act to protect another. At
the time of writing of this article, the council is developing an application for a coor-
dinated subvention (see text accompanying notes 261-67 supra) which requires addi-
tional harmonization. Wong-Woo Interview, supra note 42.
372. R. BIsH, THE PuBLic ECONOMY OF METROPOLITAN AREAS (1971) [hereinafter
cited as BisH].
373. Id. at 56, 75-77.
374. See text accompanying notes 261-75 supra.
375. BisH, supra note 372, at 76-77.
376. CAL. HEALTH & S. CODE § 24212(f) (West Supp. 1974).
377. Id. §§ 2433041.
and, again, a certain amount of local autonomy is inevitably sacrificed
when local governments establish horizontal ties with co-equal entities.
The third possibility is a system of performance standards im-
posed equally upon all local jurisdictions by some higher authority.3 78
This would eliminate some of the "disparity" from inconsistent stand-
ards within one air basin; perhaps more importantly, some of the pres-
sure upon local government to refrain from regulating sources which
contribute materially to the economy of the area might be diminished.
In California, the EPA, the ARB and the Basinwide Air Pollution
Control Coordinating Councils all prescribe emission criteria and re-
view other standards set by the counties to insure that state and fed-
eral rules will be met thereby.379  Again, however, the local entity
has lost a measure of its autonomy.
These measures may be functional and perfectly adequate
in counties like Sutter, Inyo, Calaveras and Siskiyou, and other areas
where the air quality picture is much brighter than it is, for example,
in the Bay Area or in the South Coast Air Basin. However, in regions
with severe problems (like Los Angeles), the coordinating steps we
have just mentioned are no substitute for a functioning agency with
complete control over planning, implementation, and enforcement of
air quality management in the entire air basin. 380
Possibly the single most significant criticism of political bodies of
much larger size than traditional local government is that, in most
cases, the larger the entity is the more diverse are the interests of the
population and the harder it is for the organization to make decisions
that are acceptable to all its constituents. 381 This is part of the reason
that Los Angeles County has consistently opposed efforts to impose
a regional district upon its air basin. The county first argues that the
needs of its citizens could not be given full effect in a regional district,
since it would have only the same number of representatives as every
378. BISH, supra note 372, at 127.
379. See notes 156-65 & accompanying text supra.
380. Besides the preservation of local authority, the most persuasive argument
against this position is that the large staff created by a South Coast basin district will
not be as efficient as county control because new layers of supervision, and new travel
demands, will develop. While we agree that these difficulties may arise, we do not
think they are substantial enough to override the need for the basin district.
It has also been suggested that the real basin problem is not stationary sources
but vehicular emissions, and the counties do not have any control over these. This
may be true, but the contribution of stationary source emissions to the overall air qual-
ity picture is often down-played too much. For example, a uniform policy on new fos-
sil fuel power plants is essential.
381. See, e.g., BIsH, supra note 372, at 45-61.
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other county in the district. Los Angeles fears that decisions made
by Riverside, San Bernardino, and Orange Counties, for example,
whose residents suffer from serious pollution problems, would prove
inordinately detrimental to the economy and enjoyment of citizens
of more populous Los Angeles. 8 2
Two comments are appropriate here. First, are the needs of Los
Angeles inhabitants really that different from those of other residents
of the basin? Moreover, if they do differ in terms of simple economics,
is that an acceptable distinction, or is it the kind of pressure noted ear-
lier,3813 and one which should be avoided?
Second, Los Angeles County does not want to share any control
over its air pollution regulation programs with cities within the county.
This position seems to be based on parochialism as much as anything
else. It seems only equitable that a representative of a large city such
as Los Angeles, and a representative of all the myriad of smaller cities
within the county (selected by the city selection committee), should
both be given some voice in this rather critical process.
Legislation which would have created such a South Coast APCD
was passed by the Legislature, but vetoed by the governor 3s4 largely
at the behest of Los Angeles County. The bill contained a number
of other provisions, some of which are thought to have been more ob-
jectionable to the governor than the establishment of the regional dis-
trict itself. 8 5 Consequently, the author of that work, Assemblyman
Moretti, has joined with Senator Biddle in another attempt to create
a South Coast Regional District.388 While we strongly favor the re-
gional approach in this air basin, we suggest that it may take single-
purpose legislation (which the bill is not) to get the proposal enacted.
The question, as we see it, is not which level of government
should be entrusted with air quality management, but rather what
combination will best preserve legitimate local interests while ensuring
the highest possible degree of air quality?
It seems to us essential that certain minimum levels of air quality
382. Los Angeles County, with a population of 7,036,463, is more than two and
a half times as populous as the other three counties combined (Orange County, 1,420,-
036; Riverside County, 456,074; San Bernardino County, 681,092). U.S. BUREAU OF
THE CENSUS, CouNTY AND CrIy DATA BooK: 1972.
383. See note 367 supra.
384. A.B. 2283 (1973).
385. Such as the imposition of fees upon stationary emissions sources within the
basin (not a true effluent charge), and $.001 per gallon tax on gasoline, revenues to
go to the new APCD.
386. S.B.1556 (1973).
be maintained statewide regardless of the talisman of "local auton-
omy"; and, indeed, nothing less is acceptable under the federal Clean
Air Act. It is our opinion that the state should also determine ambient
air quality standards, as it does, and effectively oversee both the es-
tablishment and the enforcement of emissions standards by local and
regional bodies, preserving, to some extent, local autonomy. Within
this framework of minimum standards, local and regional entities could
be given wide latitude to implement more stringent criteria than those
set by state law.
Moreoever, a centralized state research program makes more
sense than fragmented, local programs, and therefore this essential
function should be and is carried out by the ARB.
The "nuts and bolts" decision making, within the above frame-
work, could be left to regional and local authorities. In areas like
the South Coast Air Basin where there is a significant air pollution
problem, however, a regional entity seems a necessity.
In areas with few air quality problems, continued county-level
control, coupled with joint-powers agreements, subventions, and state
regulation, may well be acceptable. Such an approach provides a
great degree of local autonomy, without sacrificing basinwide air qual-
ity to any great extent. In such areas another level of bureaucracy
may really be superfluous, although it is questionable whether there
is, in fact, less bureacracy when the basinwide councils are imposed
above the counties.
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